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Introduction
It is unlikely that the fundamental question of government procurement will
ever be satisfactorily answered -- are the profits resulting from government pro-
curement actions inadequat_ sufficient, or excessive ? The answer demands the
existence of an acceptable index and scale_ neither economic theory nor ethics
provides such a basis for evaluating profits. However, capital in the aerospace
industry is acquired in competitive capital markets and can be put to alternative
uses; procurement agencies are obliged to pay rates which will cover the costs of
obtaining that capital.
There is a frequent assertion that the profit standards for the government
should be those levels which will "attract capital to the industry." This is a rather
ambiguous phrase; in general, it refers to profit opportunities which would warrant
the manager's investment of capital. If a firm's earnings stream was completely
certain, and assuming a competitive market for capital, the management could
properly accept investments with rates of return greater than or equal to the in-
terest rate; i. e., profit opportunities with such yields would "attract 'v capital.
Earnings, however, are uncertain,
demanded of risk or equity capital.
and there is a comparable (and higher) return
Under conditions of profit uncertainty, the
above profit standard would be achieved if the expected profit return exceeds the
rate of return which suppliers of risk capital demand. This rate will vary from
firm to firm and between industries according to the uncertainty which the sup-
pliers of capital attach to the earnings stream. This rate is the cost of equity
capital. Although firms may obtain and use capital for investments yielding lower
rates than the cost o£ capital, the net result of such actions are not in the best
interests of the stockholders.
A measure of the cost of equity capital provides a lower limit for the required
profit rate - a marginal rate. This rate is not necessarily a goal, but a boundary. 1
Although the capital cost determines "how much is just enough, " there is no measure
to determine "how much is too much." The problem of evaluating profit outcomes is
somewhat analogous to measuring utility. Total utility is unmeasurable; rates of sub-
stitution, however, are theoretically measurable. The determination of unconscion-
able profits is similarly beyond attainment, but the cost of capital should be capable
of resolution. For those who are required to make evaluations and judgment of
profit outcomes, the cost of capital provides, at lease, one definitive point.
Part I is an examination of the cost of capital in selected industry-groups,
particularly groups of firms primarily involved with government contracting. Part
I is divided into two portions: Ia presents selected time-series data and the custom-
ary ratio analysis for specific industry-groups selected; Ib evaluates over all
profit outcomes in terms of a general, or average, measure of the cost of capital
for the industry-groups developed in Ia. The procedure is exploratory and makes
adaptations of models which capital theorists offer as descriptive of market
behavior and normative for managerial decisions.
Part II of the paper was prepared by Professor Huntley, and utilizes a
1In practicality, there are often circumstances in which the manager may not
wish to accept investments with yields as low as the cost of capital, even as-
suming the latter is satisfactorily measured.
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procedure proposed by Jacoby and Weston (11) as a test of the reasonableness of
profits for Renegotiation Board objectives. Part II is presented as an indepen-
dent study of industry profits performauce with separate conclusions.
Part HI is a summary description of the various profit theories of
economics. Such a discussion is apropos to the subject of this paper; it is also
responsive to an interest exhibited by certain procurement personnel during our
discussions.
Part I
Comparative Profit Experiences and Cost of Equity Capital
Part Ia
Return on Equity for Selected Industry Groupings, 1954-1965
Other Studies
Government procurement policies and procedures are scrutinized by
government agencies, politicans, and industry groups. A focal point for much of
this interest is the profit outcome on government contracts. The attention this
subject of profitability receives underscores the importance and difficulty of the
questions involved. A review of several studies concerning aerospace-defense
industry profits is an appropriate point of departure for the analysis of this topic
in the present study.
One significant study on the defense industry was prepared by Arthur D.
Little, Inc. (2). Included in this study were sections on the defense market, the
legal aspects of defense contracting, and prognostications about the changing
patterns in these areas, but the bulk of the analysis was centered on the financial
structure and performance of the industry. The data used were from published
compilations by the Renegotiation Board, and, principally, the Aerospace In-
dustries Association publication Aerospace Facts and Figures, 1962. Small
amounts of additional data were collected by the research staff in order to obtain
sample estimates of certain structural relationships within the industry.
The analysis of profitability in the defense industry is transformed from a
traditional presentation to one which is enigmatic. It is stated that the adequacy
of profits is the essential question facing DOD and industry, but the nature of
the problem is such as to make a definitive answer unattainable. Their method of
analysis is developed from the view that the question of an adequate return is of
a deeper nature than can be resolved in terms of return on sales or return on
equity. It is possible (and necessary) they say, to measure some of the implicit
costs which profit must cover, the most important of these being the cost of capital
- defined as the return which must be provided to secure capital from investors.
For derivation of this cost of capital by their method, it is necessary to compare
the profit to the total investment required to earn the profit•
•.. the objective of (this) analysis should be to compare the
return generated by the assets employed in defense pro-
duction with the investment required to make the products•
(2: p. 58)
Due to the _agaries of accounting data - especially in the aerospace industry - ad-
justments are made on the balance sheet assets in order to approximate the total
of all assets at the disposal of the industry. The total investment required to com-
plete production in the defense industry is total balance sheet assets adjusted to
include rental capital, progress payments, loan securements, advances, and
government furnished capital. Industry earnings are concurrently adjusted to re-
flect the imputed revenue arising from the adjustments on the asset base. From
the resulting asset base and the assumption that the industry debt-equity relation-
ship prior to adjustments in the asset base is maintained, adjusted equity figures
emerge to which the adjusted earnings are compared. These adjustments to the
equity base have a significant affect on the resulting computations of return on
equity and cost of capital, the calculation of which is weighted by the adjusted
debt and equity figures.
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The principal findings andconclusions of this study, briefly, are:
(a) Return on sales and return on equity (adjusted) are low relative to
all U.S. manufacturing ... over the longterm if this continues capi-
tal will be drawn away from the industry.
(b) Analysis of cost of capital indicates that the aerospace sector is
still sufficiently profitable to attract the needed capital.
(c) Capital flight has not been observed because the industry is rela-
tively immune to cyclical variations, and financial risk, on a
given contract, is low due to the flexibility in contract forms.
(d) The defense industry will require more capital. Increased use
of debt financing must occur if the return on equity is to be main-
tained at an acceptable level, but this will increase the financial
risk to the industry through heavy fixed responsibilities. Al-
ternatively, extensive equity financing will result in even lower
returns.
Large commercial aircraft development cost write-offs in the terminal
years of this study resulted in a significant downward bias in return on sales and
return on equity. Return on equity in the aerospace industry is lowered even
further due to the above mentioned manipulations on the equity base. These ad-
justments also obscure the cost of capital calculations. But if a static cost of
capital is computed, and analysis of it indicates that the industry is sufficiently
profitable, withdrawal of investment hinds (capital flight in (c) above) is not to
be expected. Even if the level of earnings were "insufficient", it is not apparent
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what meaning is to be attached to the term "capital flight", or how this phenomena
would be characterized by financial data. As for the dilemma presented in (d),
the method of financing additional capital is not strictly a polar situation. It is well
knownthat the defenseindustry makes extensive use of extraequity capital, and this
pattern is not expected to change radically in the near future; thus, the fears ex-
pressed in this conclusion appear exaggerated.
Another major study on the aerospace industry was presented by the Stanford
Research Institute (26). Contained in this omnifarious report, prepared for the
Aerospace Industries Association, is an exhaustive financial analysis of the aero-
space industry. A myriad of financial ratios is employed to discuss the profit-
ability and structure of the industry.
This study focuses its analysis on the rate of return on total assets,
because this rate provides a more comprehensive measure of per-
formance and a better basis for comparing the results of businesses
with dissimilar financial structures. The return earned by a com-
pany on total assets is a measure of the profitability of an enterprise
as an economic entity. This single figure indicates the effectiveness
- from a profit standpoint - with which all of a firm's economic
resources are employed. (26: II - 94)
The ratios compare selected groups of aerospace firms with a "cross-section" of
104 U.S. manufacturing firms, exclusive of the aeroapace industry, over adjacent
five year segments from 1947 through 1961. There are no conclusions in the
financial section of the Stanford Research Institute paper, only observations: pro-
fit margins on sales of the aerospace group have been declining and significantly
below the "cross-section" margins; the industry has entered into a period of
relatively high and stable sales volume; the aerospace industry is more heavily
leveraged than the "cross-section," and earnings of aerospace firms appear to
have been sufficient to attract capital into the industry.
A later study, by Thomas G. Miller of Arthur D. Little, Inc. (17), con-
cludes that the aerospace market is no longer a growth market, that aerospace
firms cannot expect to grow throughout the decade, and thus should strive for
stability - especially since "the industry itself suffers from profit margins too low
to justify the large-scale and long-term support of speculative ventures." (17, p. 6)
Recent intensifications of the Southeast Asia situation have accelerated production in
the aerospace industry, and most likely have changed the base on which the growth
projections in this study were made. It appears that the recommendation that the
aerospace firms should strive for stability relies heavily on an analysis of the pro-
fit margin on sales - a statistic which must be analysed in conjunction with a turn-
over rate in order to have relevance to profitability. Evidence of any such combined
analysis is missing in this study.
The Present Study
There are no absolute measures for judging profit outcomes, and any investi-
gation of profit performance must develop its perspective in the traditional manner
of inter-industry comparisons. Preferrably, the comparative analysis would
examine profit returns on government and non-government sales by industry groups.
There are however, no published data with this break-down. The alternative is
to examineand compare financial data of firms with a high percentage of government
sales with those with a correspondingly small proportion of sales to the government.
This would provide some understanding of profit performance as it relates to
government contracting, although the results are still contaminated by nongovernment
sales experience.
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TABLE 2
PRICING GOALS OF TWENTY LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS
(i) (2) (3) (4)
Company Principal Pricing Goal
Rate of
re turn on
Investment
(after taxes)
1947-1955
Avg. Range
1956-1963 a
Avg. Range
Alcoa
American Can
du Pont
Esso (Standard Oil
of N.J.)
General Electric
General Foods
General Motors
Goodyear
Gulf
Internatfonal Har-
vestor
Johns-Manville
Kennecott
20% on investment (before
taxes); higher on new pro-
ducts
Maintenance of market share
Target return on investment
- no specific
"Fair return" target - no
specific figure given
20% on investment (after
taxes); 7% on sales (after
taxes)
33-1/2% gross margin: ("1/3
to make, 1/3 to sell, and 1/3
for profit"); expectation of
realizing target only on new
products
20% on investment (after
taxes)
'_4eeting competitors"
Follow price of most im-
portant marketer in each area
10% on investment (after
taxes
Return on investment greater
than last 15-year average
(about 15% after taxes); high-
er target for new products
Stabilization of prices
13.8 7.8- 7.95 4.5-
18.7 16.5
11.6 9.6- 9.0 7.5-
18.8 28.3
25.9 19.6- 24.6 22.1-
34.1 28.3
16.0 12.0- 12.0 9.4-
18.9 16.6
21.4 18.4- 17.7 13.7-
26.6 21.1
12.2 8.9-
15.7
na
26.0 19.9- 17.7 12.6-
27.0 23.0
13.3 9.2- 12.2 i0.I-
16.1 14.0
12.6 10.7- 12.7 10.7-
16.7 16.0
8.9 4.9-
ii .9
na
14.9 I0.7- i0.1 8.4-
19.6 13.4
16.0 9.3-
20.9
na
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Kroger Maintaining market share 12.1 9.7- na
16.1
National Steel Matching the market - 12.1 7.0- na
price following 17.4
Sears Roebuck Increasing market share 5.4 1.6- na
(8-10% regarded as satisfac- 10.7
tory share)
Standard Oil Maintain market share 10.4 7.9- na
(Indiana) 14.4
Swift Maintenance of market share 6.9 3.9- na
in livestock buying and meat II.I
packing
Union Carbide Target return on investment 19.2 13.5- 16.2
24.3
U.S. Steel 8% on investment (after 10.3 7.6- 8.8
taxes) 14.8
w
Source: /16, pp. 924-6--/
(a) Rates of Return for Identical Companies in Selected Manufacturer Industries,
1954-63. Federal Trade Commission.
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The selection of firms with a preponderance of government sales presents
its own problems. For example, one might select all firms with 95% of the sales
with the federal government as being a reasonable lower bound for inclusion in
this group. This approach is not practical on two counts: first, the number of
companies with this percentage (or higher} of sales with the government is extremely
small (and changing over time}; second, such a basis would exclude most of the
major defense contractors. This circumstance has forced a broader limit to the
classification for this study_ firms classified as "capitve" have 75% or greater
government sales and were continually included in the DOD and NASA "Top 100"
lists.
The other extreme of the industry grouping - those firms with little or no
government sales - represents a more difficult problem of selection. There are
many industries and firms with little or no sales to the federal governmer_t, in-
cluding such industries as the cosmetics, construction, etc., prima facie irrelevant
for the purposes of examination. The rationale used herein is to select the firms
with small percentages of government sales from the lists of top defense contrac-
tors. Midpoint in the time period there were 18 firms with 25% or less of their
sales to the federal government among the "Top 100" (ranked in terms of govern-
ment sales}. These were selected as the "control group." This basis of selec-
tion restricts the non-government grouping to large firms - it is a large company
fl_at can be classified in the "Top 100" with less than 25% of its sales to the federal
government. On the other hand, it defines a group of firms that are technologically
oriented, with considerable budgets for R&D, in competition for scarce engineer-
ing and technical personnel and conducting large scale manufacturing and assembl-
ing operations.
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Within each of the two major groups of firms being compared a further
break-down is made. The firms heavily dependent on government sales are divided
into three overlapping subgroups: those companies which are and have been con-
sidered the larger prime aerospace contractors, those aerospace forms which are
completely dependent on the government for their existence (greater than 90% of
total sales renegotiable), and those firms with greater than 75% of total sales re-
negotiable but not included in the first group (primarily electronics firms and smaller
aerospace firms). The first subgroup is labeled group A; the second, group B; and
the third, group C.
The firms selected for comparison with these "capitve" companies con-
ceivably have more flexibility in their pricing policies and operating methods, i.e.,
are subject to:only minimal overt governmental control. These are divided into
three broad subgroups by industry type: group D. 1, rubber and tire manufacture;
group D. 2, chemical processing and manufacture; and D. 3, automotive
products.
The following is a listing of the firms in each captive 2 and noncaptive sug-
groups.
m
2 There are several defense contractors not included in the group of captive com-
panies for one reason or another. The principal barrier to such firms was the
restriction imposed by the definition "captive," i. e., greater than 75% renego-
tiable sales. A second major barrier was the inaccessibility of data, including
complications of major mergers in the period under analysis. Three noncaptive
firms were eliminated from our analysis since they could not be formulated into
another meaningful subgroup.
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Group A
The Boeing Company
General Dynamics
Douglas Aircraft_
N. American Aviation
Lockheed Aircraft
United Aircraft
Republic Aviation
McDonnell Aircraft
Grumman Aircraft
Northrop Corp.
Group B
N. American Aviation
Northrop Corp.
Grumman Aircraft
Republic Aviation
McDonnell Aircraft
Kaman Aircraft
Marquardt Corp.
Ryan Aeronautical
Thiokol Chemical
Group C
Kaman Aircraft
Marquardt Corp.
Ryan Aeronautical
Thiokol Chemical
American Bosch Arma
Avco Corp.
Fairchild Hiller
General Precision
Hazeltine Corp.
Hoffman Electronics
Raytheon Company
Sanders Associates
Group D. 1
Firestone Tire
U.S. Rubber
B.F. Goodrich
Goodyear Tire
Group D. 2
E.I. duPont
Union Carbide
Olin Mathieson
Eastman Kodak
Group D. 3
General Motors
Ford Motor Company
Chrysler Corp.
Borg-Warner
Rockwell Standard
White Motor Company
International Harvestor
The data analysed herein are exclusively from published sources. 3 The
time period of our analysis (1954-1965) is sufficiently homogeneous for the analysis
presented in this study since it covers the period after the transition of the aerospace
industry into a more permanent "peace-time" industry - a continual supplier of
weapons and space systems. There have been changes during this period; for
example, there is now less emphasis on the procurement of heavy strategic weapon
systems and more emphasis on R&D and capability development° The advent of
NASA into the procurement picture and the shift of procurement emphasis to limited-
war weapons were important factors affecting individual firms within the industry,
but these factors have not specifically resulted in significant changes in the sales
or profit patterns of the industry as a whole. The Viet Nam buildup represents
3 The data was compiled from S. E.C. Form 10-K and annual reports filed with the
securities and Exchange Commission. Supplemental data was obtained from
Moody's Industrial Manuals, 1954-1965.
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an upward fluctuation of sales and production from the trend of the past decade, and
the consequent future developments in aerospace sales are speculative.
In any sort of comparative financial analysis a measure of performance
must be established. In the Stanford Research Institute study (26), return on net
balance sheet assets was chosen. Great pains were taken in that study to specify the
different structural relationships existing between the aerospace group and their
"cross-section", e.g., differences involving progress payments, advance payments,
rental capital, and government furnished capital, which distort the financial ratios
(including return on balance sheet assets) for comparative purposes. In the
Arthur D. Little study (2) an attempt was made to adjust, estimate, and revise
aggregations of defense firms' balance sheets and income statements to account for
the different methods of accounting for depreciation, inventories, and advances, and
also account for those forms of financial and material capital which do not show up
uu _ u_ sheet.
In both of these studies, but particularly (2), the object of the analysis
was to reflect the "true" total investment of the industry and the revenue generated
by this total investment. This approach, however, is not directly applicable to
questions of profit levels and rate of return in the defense industry. Such an
analysis may possibly be useful for comparing non-homogeneous groups of firms
with respect to operatiDg effioiency, but not relative profitability.
An analysis of profitability must be directed by a realization of what
constitutes profits and to whom they accrue. Profits are paid to holders of
equity - not owners of debt capital. This obviosity would be unwarranted, except
for the fact that it has almost been ignored in other studies. Return on total
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balance sheet assets is emphasized in the Stanford Research Institute paper (26),
and in the Arthur D. Little report (2); the manipulations made were supposed to
enable analysis of the adjusted earnings in terms of an equity base which would
result if the aerospace industry were compelled to conform its capital structure
to the average of U.S. manufacturing. However, analysis of this nature seems to
beg the question. The financial structure of the aerospace industry has evolved
over the course of many years. Politically speaking, it would seem more desir-
able to maintain the low margins and high turnovers in this industry than the
contrary; this result can be achieved (and is) through the present government
policies.
To state grounds for comparison along the lines in (2), and to a lesser extent
(26}, is to lose sight of the subject and industry being studied. An analysis focus-
ing on return on equity investment and the components of this ratio is not only
conceptually more simple than the analyses in the above studies, but provides the
only appropriate insight into the question of relative profitability.
The principal financial variables utilized in this analysis are:
Net Worth
Profit
Sales
Owner's equity portion of the balance sheet, less
preferred stock 4 and treasury stock (symbol NW}.
Net income (net of interest} less preferred divi-
dends before corporate income taxes (symbol Pbt)
or after corporate income taxes (symbol Pat).
Net sales, and other operating income when only
available in combined form (symbol S).
4 Preferred stock is considered a form of'debt in our analysis since the
dividend for this form of security is generally fixed in amount and, at
least tacitly, in regularity; thus, it is essentially equivalent to a
debenture.
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Total Assets Total balance sheetassets, net of accumulated
depreciation, progress payments and advances
(symbol TA).
In this part of the study return on equity is analysed via the static ratio
Pat/NW. Fluctuations and trends in this ratio over time can be examined in terms
of changes in profits, the equity base, or both. In addition, institutional and policy
affected relationships, e.g., financial structure, profit margin, utilization or
turnover rates, etc., can be analysed as component parts of the return on equity
ratio. A comparison of each of the groups selected is made in terms of these ratios.
As stated above, the effect of procurement policy on the return on the in-
vestment of the stockholder is our main interest; this return is expressed in the
ratio Pat/NW. Profit margin on sales, Pbt/S, is examined using pre-tax profits
in order to avoid the complications arising from loss carryovers. The ratio of pro-
fit t_.os_lp..q i._ mn.qt rdn_,ly .q_"m'lfiniT.J_l hy _11 nu'l_f-io_ imrnl',_l n'r, i_*,_-r,_÷,:_l i'n n'rn
curement matters. This close attention is only partially justified since the profit
margin is but a partial indication of profitability. This statistic must be combined
with me asures of structural and financial leverage in order to determine its
revelance to return on equity. An important measure of structural leverage in this
regard is the turnover rate, S/TA, and the measure of financial leverage used in
this part of the study is equity assets as a proportion of total assets, NW/TA.
Decomposition of return on equity into the above three ratios enables con-
sideration of the different methods of operation between industry groups. Variations
in the rate of return over time can be reduced to fluctuations in one or more of the
component parts of the ratio.
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Aggregate time-series for each captive and noncaptive group are presented
in Figures 1 - 6. Ratios of these aggregate data are presented in Figures 7 - 10,
e.g., Pat/NW for group A in year t is calculated C_(Pat) i-7 //__A(NWI_i J,
where i represents the firms in group A. For each captive subgroup, time-series
scatter charts were plotted oneachof the four principal ratios, Pat/NW, NW/TA,
Pbt/S, S/TA, analysed in this part of the study, and the median values for each of
these ratios are presented in Figures 11-14, respectively.
Summary of the Data
Return on equity declined for all captive and noncaptive subgroups over the
period 1954 to 1960-61. This time period corresponds to the latter part of the
period analysed in (2) and (26). As mentioned previously, much of the precipitous
decline in earnings of group A in the years 1958-61 was due to rapid write-offs of
5
commercial aircraft developmental costs. The decline in the rate of return over
this period was much more severe in the aerospace firms (groups A and B) than
for any of the noncaptive groups. (See Figures 7, 11, and Table 1 below). Since
1961 the rate of return on equity has been rising for groups A, D. 2, and D. 3, and
stable for groups B, C, and D. 1. At the end of our time period return on equity
for groups A and B is in the 14% - 17% range compared with 25% in 1954;
group C, the beginning and ending rates are approximately equal at 10%.
captive groups D. 2 and D. 3, the initial and terminal rates are approximately 20%,
for
For non-
The effect of these commercial write-offs on the rate of return for group
A somewhat distorts the analysis of the impact of procurement policy on
profitability in this group. These distortions should be eliminated from
the analysis, but it is not possible to separate results of government busi-
ness from those on non-government business within the confines of
published data.
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while the rate of return on equity in D. 1 declined from 15% to 11% over the period
examined.
One of the factors accounting for the rapid d_cline in the rate of return on
equity for groups A and B during the first half of our time period was the accelerated
growth rate of net worth in those groups. Growth of profits did not keep pace with
growth of net worth over this period. Growth rates of earnings and net worth were
not significantly different for the other groups or in the later time period; consequently,
changes in rates of return were not as drastic.
Analysis of changes in financial structure (Figure 8) reveals that this rapid
growth of net worth in group A was concurrent with as rapid a growth rate of total
assets, whereas in group B net worth increased faster than other balance sheet
items during this early period. 6 For group C net worth was a relatively constant pro-
portion of total assets from 1954_60, and has been an increasing proportion thereafter.
Over the whole period net worth increased as a proportion of total assets in all groups
except D. 2 and D. 3. The captive firms have made considerably more use of this fin-
ancial leverage than have the noncaptive firms, although there has been a narrowing
of the gap over time.
Changes in the structural leverage, turnover on sales, should be considered
in conjunction with the measure of financial leverage. The affects of leverage on the
return on equity can be examined by considering these two ratios together. Turnover
rates are traditionally higher in the aerospace industry than in any of the groups
chosen for comparison (see Figures 10 and 14). This may be due in part to the nature
In Figure 12, however, all the captive subgroups maintained about the same fin-
ancial structure from 1954 to 1959-60; at that point the financial leverage in each
group was reduced, and a new level was established for the remainder of the period.
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of the products in the various industries, but the difference is principally a result
of the methods of operation which have evolved in the aerospace industry. Turn-
over rates are higher in the aerospace industry because of the items specifically
excluded from total assets in this industry. Examples of these items range from
the various forms of fixed assets, e.g., government furnished buildings and equip-
ment and extensive use of rental capital, to financial support in the form of progress
payments and loan securements.
Turnover rates were fairly constant for all captive and noncaptive subgroups
through the middle of the observed time period. A slight downtrend in this rate
was experienced by groups A, B, and D. 3 at the beginning of the period, but these
same groups experienced increases in this rate in the latter portion of the time
period. Group C (electronics and small aerospace firms) appears not to enjoy the
same level of direct support, reflected by the turnover rates, as do the larger aero-
space firms. The differential between turnover rates, from noncaptive group D. 2,
at 1.0, to captive groups A and B, at almost 3.0, is relatively greater than the differ-
ence in the financial leverage, with net worth representing 70% of total assets in
D. 2, as compared to 40-50% in groups A and B. The combined effect of both forms
of leverage results in sales to net worth ratiosof approximately 6.0 ) in the aero-
space industry, but only 1.5 to 2.5 in the noncaptive groups. Consequently, a mar-
gin on sales in the aerospace groups considerably below that in the noncaptive
groups can, due to the greater leverage experienced by the former groups, result
in an equivalent or greater return on equity.
Much attention is given to the rate of profit on sales. Captive groups have
experienced only a modest decline in profit margins over the time period analysed,
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i.e., a decline from approximately 77oin 1954 to about 570 in 1965. (See Figures
9 and 13). And, smoothing the dip due to commercial write offs in the middle of
the period, the decline has been very gradual. The margin experience in the
three noncaptive subgroups is varied, but a slight downtrend in margins over time
is also apparent.
The attention given to the rate of profit on sales is warranted if due considera-
tion is also given to leverage factors, since profits margins are related to return
figures only through the leverage factor. Profit margin levels of captive and non-
captive groups are very different. The margins in the captive groups are low relative
to groups D. 2 and D. 3, but the leverage factors in these latter groups are very low
relative to the aerospace groups, with the net result (return on equity) being
comparable among all of these groups.
An Alternative Calculation of Return on Equity
The emphasis in this discussion of relative profitability centers on return on
equity. The analysis in this study focuses on the static ratio of profits after taxes
to net worth presented in the form Pat/NW in Figures 7 and 11, This calculation is
adequate for the general presentation intended here. In Table 1 below, the rate of
return on equity is calculated slightly differently. The equity base on which the pro-
fits are earned is constantly changing with each financial transaction, and, given a
steady growth in this equity, year-end figures for this base lend a slight downward
bias to the return ratio. Also, the profit being compared to the base is included in
the base. The following adjustment are made to the equity base used in computing
the rate of return on equity.
2O
adj NW(t) =. 5/__-NW(t)- Pat (t)- Div(t) - NW(t-I__
This adjusted equity represents an average of the base on which the annual
profits were earned. Net Income after taxes, less preferred dividends, are divi-
ded by the adjusted equity figures and the resulting returns are presented in Table
1. The return rates in Table 2 are within the range of profit objectives determined
in the Lanzillotti study /16, pp. 924-6/which immediately follows this table.
Table 2
Return on Equity Capital in Captive and Noncaptive Groups (1954 - 1961)
year A B C D. 1 D. 2 D. 3
1954 30.92%
1955 27.24
1956 22.99
1957 22.32
1958 15.09
1959 7.37
1960 7.49
1961 (0.95)
1962 16.59
1963 14.91
1964 15.22
1965 18.53
31 14%
37 92
20 20
19 94
15 71
16 80
13 53
14 69
14 21
i3 95
13 68
16 61
12.76% 15.06% 21.34% 22.68%
9.57 17.13 23.27 28.94
0.01 15.33 19.62 16.17
14.24 13.79 17.83 15.87
6.04 11.43 14.56 8.80
14.19 12.87 17.39 16.37
7.36 10.93 15.70 15.36
10.48 10.64 15.21 13.03
12.10 9.36 16.57 18.95
8.96 9.18 17.71 19.48
9.66 11.05 20.03 19.96
11.10 11.22 19.54 22.64
Profit Objectives of Large Corporations
Our dependence upon a comparative inter-industry examination was pre-
biously explained; it is useful to examine the declared profit objectives of the
managers of large corporations. If constant pursuit and examination of the proper
use of stockholders' capital has any reward, the avowed goals of the managerial
group should provide a useful basis for evaluating profit performance.
One of the few papers providing information on corporate profit objectives
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was prepared by Lanzillotti/16/. His study was the result of a lengthy investiga-
tion into the pricing objectives of various large corporations - companies generally
large enough to be price leaders or at lease "masters of their fates"; hence, they
are able to adjust pricing to the company's general goal.
Lanzillotti found that although a firm may have many pricing objectives (and
the companies which he investigated were not exceptional in this regard), pricing to
achieve a target return on investment was by far the most frequently mentioned of the
pricing goals. About 50% of the firms with this pricing objective indicated that they
were attempting to achieve a particular rate of return on investment in either the
short-run or long-run or both.
Table 2 is taken from the Lanzillotti paper/__6;pp.924-_67, except for column
4. which has been added. This table presents in summary form the profit objectives
of the firms examined and their actual performance as measured by return on equity
capital. The average target return mentioned was 14% after taxes; several firms
stated that their goals were 20% after taxes. The exceptionally low profit objective
for U. S. Steel apparently evolved from the company's continual position of political
scapegoat_ a low profit goal was selected with a primary emphasis on its public
7
image. Based upon the average return on the years 1947-55, most of the firms
exceeded their target goals. However, this w_s a period of relatively high business
prosperity. Column 4 indicates that several firms (for which data were compiled
by the FTC} show average returns in the past decade below the target goals.
Data in Column 4 indicates the degree to which U.S. Steel has attained its
target goal in the last decade. The firm's recent efforts to increase pro-
fits does not suggest that a modest profit goal has improved the firm's
position as a political dart board.
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This is a significant study for our purposes. For one thing, it is a clear
statement of pricing objectives, based upon standard volumes and standard costs.
Further, they represent long-run objectives - objectives which the managers have
determined as practicable and desirable when combining all of the firm's objectives,
such as sales maximization, public image, etc. But they also represent a coUective
managerial opinion of what is a "fair profit" (a statement that was frequently made in
defense of a particular profit goal). A manager's appraisal of fairness is not neces-
sarily an adequate measure of an ethical concept - if such a measure is at all perti-
nent. But it is another manifestation of what constitutes "adequate" returns which,
if not determined by a free market, are at least highly conditioned by one. S While these
profit objectives are not necessarily those which should be adopted by government con-
tractors (note that no primary government contractor is represented in Table 2), they
do provide a certain basis for judgment of profit goals and achievements of any large
corporation. The data are, however, somewhat dated, they illustrate profit objec-
tives of apparently 10 years ago. The subsequent period, 1954 to date, has been
characterized by intense competition and a general lowering of margins and rates
of return for most industries. It is certainly unlikely that the profit goals would
be significantly greater than those expressed in Table 2.
One point should be noted in examining the data in Table 2. Capital-manage-
Joel Dean cites 4 criteria for determining what "reasonable" profits should be
/5; p. 34_-/: (1) what it takes to attract outside capital, (2) earnings needed to
finance the firm's development solely from retained profits (plus depreciation);
(3) what comparable firms have normally earned; (4) what the man in the street
thinks is a reasonable profit. Therefore, the words "fair profit" encompass a
number of considerations and judgments improperly described by the ill-
chosen adjective "fair."
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ment procedures and objectives are by no means unfform_ however, most investment
decisions are formulated on the total amount of capital involved - both equity and debt
capital. Therefore, the profit objectives as stated in Column 2 are assumed to be.
rates based on total capital employed. Columns 3 and 4, however, are based upon re-
turn to equity capital only. Therefore, a firm with some leverage would typically
make more on equity than the target goals. Furthermore, the target goals involve
future expectations while the return on capital involves past experience. In this
regard, Column 2 provides data more appropriate to the analysis foliowing in section
2 than d3 Columns 3 and 4.
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Table 2. -- Ratio of Calculated Earnings to Actual Earnings for Individual
Companies Composing the Group of NASA Contractors and the Aggregate of
Standard Companies, Ten-year Periods terminating in 1953, 1958, and 1963
|
|
Company (Industry group) C/A Ratio I
1963 1958 1953
NASA Contractors:
Boeing (Aerospace) 2 1.36 1.61 0 99o,0,o....e,,o,oI,°,°ooloe.Qoo..,,oo,o
United (Aerospace) 3 ..................................... 1.24 0.99 1.40
North American (Aerospace) ............................... 0.71 1.02 0.99
General Dynamics (Aerospace) ............................. 0.35 0.99 0.98
Lockheed (Aerospace) 3 .................................... 0.43 1.39 1.09
3
Douglas (Aerospace) .................................... 0.74 1.80 0.99
McDonnell (Aerospace) _................................... 0.71 1.46 1.88
Northrup (Aerospace) .................................... 2.33 1.35 0.34
Republic (Aerospace) .................................... 3.60 3.26 0.66
Grumman (Aerospace) ..................................... 0.83 2.58 0.70
Standard Companies :
General Motors Corporation (Automobile) 2 ................. 0.38 1.26 0.41
Ford Motor Company (Automobile) ......................... 0.99 2.32 a
E.I. du Pont (Chemical) .................................. 0.23 0.'44 0.25
Union Carbide (Chemical) ................................. 0.43 0.55 0.32
Chrysler Motors (Automobile) ............................. 0.52 b 0.64
Firestone (Rubber) 2 ...................................... 0.86 1.59 0.95
Goodrich (Rubber) ........................................ 1.22 1.46 0.98
Olin-Mathieson (Chemical) ................................. 0.85 3.55 0.51
United States Rubber (Rubber) ............................ 2.28 3.29 1.19
Borg-Warner (Automobile) ................................. 0.98 2.28 0.65
Libby-Owen-Ford (Stone, clay, glass) 2 ................... 0.51 0.97 0.71
Corning (Stone, clay, glass) ............................. 0.20 0.46 0.48
Anchor-Hocking (Stone, clay, glass) ...................... 1.12 1.26 1.46
I
n
i
I
I
I
I
I
I
i. See table I, footnote 2
2. Companies ranked within NASA group and within Standard group by size of equity
capital claims in 1963. Companies specifically designated by this footnote are
largest companies in their own industrial groupsings.
3. These companies typically experience between sixty and eighty-nine per cent of
their revenue deriving from the Federal Government; all other NASA contractors on
this list experience more than ninety per cent of their revenues from government
sources. See: Standford Research Institute, The Industry-Government Aerospace
Relationship, Vol II, pp. 90-91.
a. Could not be calculated since Ford Motors was not an open corporation until 1954.
Similarly, the 1958 C/A ratio is not based on ten-year yield and payout data as is
so for other companies.
b. Could not be calculated meaningfully since Chrysler had a loss in 1958 -- a nega-
tive value for A would obtain.
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission, Standard and Poor, and Moody: see source
of table i.
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PART I-b
A Measure of Capital Cost
The Economist's Concept of Profit and Value
The economist's measurement of profit differs from that used by the
accountant. The profit rate to the accountant is the residual income (after costs,
including taxes and other obligations) divided by the total equity capital. The value
of an asset is represented by the book value of that asset, which is based on its cost.
The economist would argue that an asset has no value whatsoever unless it has future
earning power; i. e., unless it will generate a future stream of earnings. The size
and the timeliness of this future stream of earnings determines the value of the
asset. Net income is essentially a speculation about the future, and the responsible
9
assets have a value which is a function of this future earning power.
A study of comparative industry incomes using the economist's definition
assets. Since we are also concerned with historical profitperformance, the return
on a capital asset is therefore given as the discount rate of the subsequent earnings
stream to that investment. Therefore a method for measuring return on investment
would necessarily depend upon the theory of compound interest.
Cost of Capital
Under market conditions involving complete certainty of profit outcomes, the
cut-off rate (or the cost of capital) would be the prime interest rate. (In fact, there
9 See Joel Dean/5/for a discussion of the conceptual conflict between the
economisfs and the accountanfs definition of profits.
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would be only one interest rate. } However, under conditions of uncertainty, the
investors will discount the future earnings stream according to the degree of uncer-
tainty which they place on it, and the cost of equity capital will be higher than the
interest rate. The cut-off rate or the rate at which investments should not be
accepted (or the rate at which the investment would be an injustice to the stockholders}
is determined through the market price of the stock.
if it increases the value of the owner's equity, i.e.,
"An asset is worth acquiring
if it adds more to the market
value of the firm than the costs of acquisition." /_18; p. 262_/.
The traditional cost of equity capital is the reciprocal of the price-earnings
ratio. (For an example of this usage see Soule, /24_/. ) There are situations where
this ratio might be a pertinent and adequate measure - particularly when there is no
growth in earnings. However, Nemmers/21_ p. 385_ describes a particular problem
which "is frequently overlooked in the literature of capital budgeting." A company
which has an exceptional earnings potential will have its stock bid-up. This, in turn,
will make the earnings-price ratio low. Therefore, a growth company will have a
low cost of capital, or a low cut-off point. The opposite would be true for a firm with
poor earnings expectations. But the value of the growth firm's stock is high because
the stockholders expect the management to earn a rate considerably greater than the
cut-off point as estimated by the earningsrprice ratio. And vice versa; poor earn-
ings expectations will cause the price of the stock to decrease, often resulting in an
increase in the earnings-price ratio. The earnings-price ratio tends to vary in-
versely with profit rate expectations and the cost of equity capital as measured by the
traditional earnings-price ratio leads to basic inconsistencies. This is the primary
motivation for seeking a measure which incorporates the growth or expected growth
of the earnings.
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Cost of Equity Capital Involving a Growth Factor
The basis for the following analysis was derived from a paper by Gordon
and Shapiro_/9_/ As in most recent developments in capital, theory their method is
based upon compound interest theory and the assumption the value of any asset is
determined by the future earnings derivable from that asset discounted at a proper
rate. The market value of a share of stock in the time period zero, Vo, is
Vo = _/_Dt (l+k) -t 7
where D t is the total dividends paid in period t and k is the discount rate, or rate of
return. The rate of return, therefore, is determined from the present known price
and the expected future dividends. The authors made certain assumptions: (1) the
dividends are paid continuously and are, accordingly, discounted continuously, and
(2) the dividends will grow at an exponential rate. Continuously discounting dividends
with an exceptional growth rate results in the following expression:
= pgt_-ktdt
Vo _Do .....
O
= Do/(k_g ) (1)
where D O is the dividends in the initial time period and g is the exponential growth
rate.
The Question of Earnings Versus Diwidends
Innumerable pages have been written on the subject of investor objectives in
purchasmg securities. There is particular disagreement on the issue of whether the
investor purchases a discounted stream of future dividends or a discounted stream
of future earnings. Graham and Dodd, in one of the classic 'texts on investments
/ 10/, maintain that dividends have an influence on the market price of the share
that is three times greater than that of earnings. Other capital theorists support
m w
this argument / 8/, / 4/. The assigned relative importance to dividends is
4O
apparently derived from considerable regression analyses of stock prices, dividends
and earnings. The net results of these regression models have been regression
coefficients with the relative size of 3:1 for dividends and earnings respectively.
Other capital theorists argue, conversely, that earnings are more impor-
tant. /-25 7, / 6/. A recent paper by Friend and l>uckett / 7 / presents a convinc-
ing argument that the earnings, not dividends, are the more important influence on
stock prices in about the reverse ratio; t. e., earnings are about three times as
important as dividends in the stockholders evaluations. Their arguments are based
upon a careful consideration of the biases inherent in regression analyses which might
have led to the results accepted by the "dividend proponents." But they further
develop rational arguments as to why dividends are not as important as earnings to
the stockholder's evaluations. Not the least important of their arguments is the ob-
vious inconsistency of the dividend-motivation hypothesis with observable investor
attitudes. During the last several years there has been a considerable market in-
terest in growth stocks, and few analysts and students of the market are other than
skeptical of the importance of dividends on the market price of the stock. There
have been several instances of dividend rates on high grade stocks less than the
interest rate of good quality securities, and a Merril Lynch study (quoted in/_ 7_/)
indicates that capital gains are of primary importance to the stockholder. But the
authors also point out that the behavioral assumptions necessary to support the
41
thesis that dividends are more important than earnings are quite suspect.10
This lower evaluation (on retained earnings} could exist ff any
one of the following situations is present: (1) the average hold-
er of common stock possesses, at the margin of his portifolio,
a very strong preference for current income over future in-
come (a situation which could hardly be expected to persist over
time);(2) the expected increase in earnings arising from increased
per-share investment is viewed as involving a much higher
degree of risk than that aftaching to earnings on existing corporate
assets; (3) the profitability of incremental corporate investment,
as viewed by shareholders, is extremely low relative to the
competitive yield prevailing in the stock market. However,
neither of these assumptions (the first two) is consistent with
observed behavior of the market. /_7, p. 658j
While the subsequent analysis will adopt Gordon's basic formula (actually a well-
known actuarial formula), expected earnings will be used instead of expected
dividends.
= _ ebte-rtdt = Eo/(r-b )Vo E o
r _
E
o +b
V
O (2)
The value of r is a measure of the cos't of equity capital. The responsibility
of the manager for the stockholders' capital is defined as that of maximizing the
value of the company, and the cost of capital is a rate of return below which mana-
10joel Dean notes/_5, p. 5757 that dividends are paid to keep stockholders passive
and management enthroned. The plow-back earnings are the "pure" earnings.
This observation seems reasonable in view of the customary stable dividend
policies of corporations. On the other hand, examination of Figures 1-6, indicate
that net worth as a function of time has a remarkably uniform linear appearance
on semi-log paper. This indicates strongly that the managers are deliberately
reinvesting a given percentage of the previous year's book value - i. e., they
are maintaining a constant exponential growth rate. This, in turn, would indicate
that a stable retention rate has precedent over a stable dividend rate. In any
event, it is difficult to be convinced that the purchaser of common stock is pri-
marily concerned with the dividends.
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gers shouldnot accept investments involving equity capital. 11
Studentsof capital theory may object that (2) is incomplete since it avoids
(an even more controversial area} the measurement of capital cost whenboth debt
and equity capital are combined. This paper has objectives which differ from
those of the corporate managerwho must decidebetweenvarious investment op-
portunities andthe nature of the financing. The concern here is with the net results
which accrue to the stockholder given the particular environment in which they were
generated. Whatever the factors which influence the earnings stream, the stock-
holder will determine its expectedgrowth and the uncertainty attached to it andwill
bid the price of the stock accordingly. Differences in the rate of return on the
market value of the stock,or the cost of capital, should represent incremental dif-
ferences in the evaluationof risk which the market attaches to the collective
securities of each industry-group. (Similar to the assumptions made by Modigliani
m
and Miller/18 /, each industry-group in the study is assumed to constitute a
homogeneous risk-class).
There is another possible objection to (2). The cut-off rate is the point at
which the stockholder, theoretically, is equally benefited from receiving his
earnings as dividends or having them reinvested. However, earnings reinvested
are not subject to personal income taxes and, therefore, the cut-off rate should be
adjusted for an income tax increment. In view of the fact that the data used con-
stitute broad industry averages and our interest is in a comparative analysis, an
adjustment for the tax rate appeared to be an unnecessary refinement.
11
For a statement of objectives commensurate with capital management, see
Solomon/23/and Modigliani and Miller/18/.
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Historical Measures of Performance
A man's earn£ugs can be Viewed as a life-time annuity which he receives
in periodic shares. The present value of this annuity at any time m his life is
the discounted subsequent installments on this annuity. The present value can
be determined from the expected future earnings, or it could be determined by the
same procedures after his demise - which is equivalent to the assumption of "per-
fect foresight." For a corporation, which can be assumed to have perpetual life,
the earnings stream can be assumed to continue to infinity° Therefore the value
of a firm's assets at any point in time is, equivalently, the discounted profit stream
accruing to these assets. However, the point in time for evaluating the assets is
not necessarily restricted to the "present" - it can involve prior periods for which
part of the earnings stream has been observed.
of periodic earnings. However, the use of a continuous function/as in (23[7requires,
instead, the determination of the growth rate and the nature of the earnings function
with time. Itmay be argued that the earnings function is better represented by a
growth function (such as the logistic)than by an exponential. However, the earnings
trends seem well represented by the exponential function for the period studied and
for the near future. (See Figures 1-6). Also, the earnings growth rate is such
that for most groups studied, the discount rate is comparatively high, which in turn
means the earnings of the more distantyears becomes heavily discounted and com-
paratively inconsequential. While other functions are theoretically more sound, the
exponential function appears adequate for the present analysis.
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If N o
year, then
is the book value of the firm (or the industry group) for any selected
= _ ebte - ftdt = Eo/(/a -b)N O E o
p= (Eo/No) +b (3)
is therefore determined by the return on equity for any selectedThe profit rate,p ,
year plus the growth rate. This measure of return on capital involves the expected
or subsequent profits stream. Besides offering a conceptually preferrable measure,
it avoids inconsistencies similar to those associated with measur4ng the cost of
capital with the earnings-price ratio. For example, it is quite possible for two
firms exhibiting identical values of Et/N t to have widely differing earnings expecta-
tions - even parameters with opposite sign. As measured by (3), the rates of return
would be different.
If the use of the exponential function is defensible for the expression of earn-
ings growth, it remains to determine the parameters E ° and b. In our analysis this
was accomplished by a least-squares fit of an exponential function to the empirical
data. As stated, in most instances it would appear that an exponential function is a
fairly uncontestable function - at least for the period examined. Its adequacy for the
future years is briefly discussed later.
The applicability of (2) as a measure of historical cost of capital presents
additional problems. Unlike the measurement of_ , the estimate of r does depend
upon a representation or measure of market expectations at any one given point of
time. The smoothing of historical earnings data does not necessarily provide an
unbiased representation of the expectations of the market at some instant. For
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example, during a time period in which the historical earnings are adequately
represented with an e.xponential trend and a positive exponent, the market, on the
average, couldhave been anticipating a different growth factor, even a negative
one. This example seems to imply a rather extreme situation and, over a reason-
able time period, the expectations regarding earnings should on the average oscillate
about the rate as empirically determined by fitting a function to the data. This as-
sumption is critical to the analysis developed here.
There are_ then, two interest rates, one which discounts the earnings stream
to a given book value and another which discounts the same earnings stream to the
market value of the firm. It appears that a useful comparison can be made between
the two interest rates. Two different firms (or industry-groups} would have the
earnings streams discounted at different rates by the market depending upon the
u.zx_x _L.t_vy wxil_Lt iS _,_,a._nt_,u to that atx-emn.......... uz_eai_uiiigs. "_xxoiie gi-ailts _e previous
assumptions (that the market anticipates the earnings growth as exponential and
with the rate as empirically determined}, two firms with identical interest rates, r,
should be interpreted as being in the same risk class. The ratio z = r_ would be
an index of the extent m which the market "discounts" the actual rate of return on
equity capital in order to achieve the acceptable rate of return. In ether words, a
value of z = 1.0 would indicate that the actual return on capital for the particular
industry group is equivalent to the rate of return which the market associates with
a given uncertainty of earnings; a value of z)l. 0 would indicate that the investments
12
are yielding less than the cost of capital.
12There is a considerable similarity in this measure and the C/A ratio used by
Prof. Huntley in Section HI.
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A measure or index of relative performance might be derived from the
ratio z. A firm which makes a return onbook value in excess of what the mar-
ket requires for that risk class of security will have its stock bid-up accordingly.
The smaller thevalue of z, the greater the relative profit performance, i.e., the
greater margins by which the actual rate of return exceedsthe required rate of
return. This is, therefore, a measure of relative profit performance adjusted
for uncertainty, andthe evaluator of the uncertainty or risk is the market place.
While this measure obviously provides no absolute criteria to evaluategood or bad
performance, it will allow a ranking in terms of profit performance or investment
opportunities. Sofar as government policy is concerned, if the ratio is approach-
ing 1.0 it would indicate that the profit outcome is becoming marginal, or that
the actual rate is approaching the cost of funds; i. e., a rate at which the manager
is justified in paying earnings to stockholders rather than retaining and investing
it at the present rate of return.
The Empirical Determination of r, _ , and z
Our comparative analysis is concerned with the net worth (book value), mar-
ket value of common stock, and net earnings after taxes. The data used were the
annual totals of the above measures for each industry grouping. The data were
first plotted on semi-log paper.
exponential growth in earnings.
that an exponential functtUn is a reasonable assumption.
function
bt
E(t) = ae
Our model (as previously explained) assumes an
The linear appearance of the functions indicates
The parameters of the
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were determined from the earnings data of each of the industry-groups. The value
of b, of course, represents the growth rate of the earnings. The values of r and
p can then be determined from equations (2) and (3).
in the investigation can be selected as the period t=0.
Any of the 12 years included
(In other words, we can
determine the values of r and/_ for any given year by the substitution of the earnings
net worth and market value for the year. ) However, rather than compute r andp
for individual years, an "average" book value (N) and market value (V) are also
expressed as exponential functions of time. (The nature of the function is clearly
13
indicated in Figures 1-6. ) Therefore
dt
N(t) = ce
V(t) = fe gt
_"t -- _,_-" I _,_ ! ' _ _,_ _I _
r(t) = (aebt/f_ t) + b = (a/_e (b-g)t +b
Our examination covers the period 1954 to 1965. The parameter values for
the above functions are presented in Table 3. The derived values for the functions
p (t), r(t) and z(t) are given in Figures 15.
13
It is apparent that N(t), V(t) and E(t) are not independent functions as their use
here implies. However, these equations are developed to examine the changes
in these ratios over the time period, and the assumption of independent functions
is a convenience.
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Table 3
Parameter Values for E(t}, N(t) and V(t)
a b c d e f
Group A 180
B 53
C 29
D.1 161
D.2 583
D.3 1136
040 866
050 340
087 231
034 1200
040 3170
075 6800
078
095
065
049
075
088
Parameter values for a, c, and f are $106
A Digression on Trend Extrapolation
1489 066
404 112
309 106
2010 061
12850 045
12130 091
All of the industry-groups showed pronounced increases in earnings between
1964 and 1965. The Federal Reserve Index of aerospace production began a steep
rise about the middle of 1965- which coincided with developments in the Southeast
Asia involvement. (See Aviation Week, March 7, 1966, p. 65). The increases
indicated in the other, nonaerospace groupings coincide with the general pros-
perity (and inflation) which was evident in this period.
The question remains as to whether the functions and parameters based
upon the past 12 years are proper expressions for the near future. Expansion of
our military effort in East Asia would, of course, maintain the more rapid in-
crease in the over all aerospace production (and profits) evidenced in 1965. Also,
during the last few years, the procuring agencies have followed a definite policy
to raise fees; this effort may be limited, but it should contribute to a somewhat
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higher profit pattern for subsequentyears. On the other hand, as shownin
Figures 8 and 12, the ratio of net assets to the total assets has been increasing.
The fact that net worth has been increasing faster than profits may be due to
government's decision to furnish the contractors with less government capital.
[2, pp. 67, 69[. The general shift to a greater equity base is not likely to continue
indefinitely into the future. A reduction in the rate at which book value is accumulated
in relation to earnings would increase the return on capital. But this is essentially
implying that the industry can expect their investments to yield a greater rate of
return - that the growth rate of equity will decrease while that of prohts remains
unchanged. It is likely that any material change in the earnings rate would depend
upon continued expansion of the present crisis atmosphere. On the other hand, it
would not appear that even a satisfactory cease-fire development in Viet Nam would
cause any ieveiiing or down-trend m the 10-year growth picture; t. e., such a poli-
tical development would warrant the assumption of a growth rate similar to those
exhibited by the present pattern° In short, it would appear that the present growth
rate would form a reasonable lower bound to the near future earnings growth° The
profits of the large aerospace firms are also affected by their commercial or non-
government sales. Without a detailed analysis, it would appear that the develop-
ment of supersonic and large cargo aircraft would dominate this nongovernment
14The development of weighted guide-line pricing and the emphasis on incentive
contracting is definitely related to this objective. In fact, we believe that
any measure of the efficency of incentive contracting should be related to its
influence on the margin outcomes rather than to efficiency. This objective of
price flexibility is not publicized; disguise of these objectives of procurement
policy is quite rational and necessary.
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picture and, for the industry as a whole, support the estimated profit trends, at
least for Group A.
An earnings prognosis for the nonaerospace industry presents more un-
certainties. This writing coincides with two precipitous drops of the stock market.
As interpreted by the Wall Street Jourv{al (May 9, 1966_, a primary causal factor
was the general belief that earnings and production have been at a maximum level
and any adjustment must be downward. It is reasonable to foresee the earnings
trends for the non-defense industry levelling off in the near future, but after review-
ing several nongovernmental prognostications of business conditions, there appears
nothing to support a change in the long-term growth pattern in the near future.
The preceeding arguments are not intended to substitute for the intensive
study necessary to support predictions of future business conditions. They are
offered to support a hypothesis that the "average" earnings functions which have
been derived provide reasonable predictions for the near-term. Since continuous
discounting places heavy emphasis on the near-term, especially at the interest
rates considered here, the demands for long-term predictions are minimized.
Examination of the Measures (t}, r(t} and z(t}
The Return on Net Worth, _ (t} "
!
All of the industry-groups examined indicate a decreasing return on net
worth by this measure. The decrease has been the greatest for groups A and B.
This is not surprising in view of the exceptional profit "peak" experienced by the
aerospace groups about the beginning of the time period studie_s here. The C-
group maintains its high relative position because of a measure rapid growth rate
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in the earnings relative to the increase in net worth; all of the other declines
in the measure of return were for the converse reason.
It is informative to compare these returns on capital with the profit
goals which were reported by Lanzillotti and presented in Column 2, Table 2.
All of the groups showed profit returns in the range of 12% to 20% - generally
comparable to the expressed profit goals of the major companies. It is also evident
that the rate of return for groups A, B, D. 1 and D. 2 are close to those determined
in Section I, especially at the end of the period. This results from the comparatively
small differences in their growth rates in earnings which changes their relative
position in the rankings and size of the profit rates.
The Rate of Return on Market Value, r(t_
It is our hypothesis that the investors will bid-up the market value of a
common stock until the accepted interest rate for a particular risk-class of stock
will discount the expected after-tax earnings. Therefore stocks bearing the same
interest rate (as measured by discounted future earnings}would be of the same risk
class. At the beginning of the period, groups A, B, C and D. 3 appear to group
together while D. 1 and D. 2 are distinctly separate. If the smoothed exponential
expression for earnings is an "unbiased" representation of the average earnings
expectations, it would appear that early in the period studied the industry groups
were divided into at least two distinct risk-groups. During this time period there
appears to be a general change in the market's evaluation of the comparative risk
of the groups in that the cost of capital for the large aerospace firms dropped to
a position between the D. 3 and C groups (auto and smaller aerospace) at the
upper bound and the chemical and tire groups at the other.
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This appears to be a consistent result. The aeruspace industry as a whole,
has experienced remarkable steady sales since 1954 and these prospects continue_
the present defense and NASA budgets areunlikely to be altered drastically in the
foreseeable future. Group C (the smaller firms doing more than 75% government
business) which has the greatest irregularity of earnings, maintained the highest
discount rate. The groups D. 1, D. 2 and D. 3, have maintained a rather consistent
discount rate over the period. This would be expected in view of the maturity of these
industries and the market's knowledge of the nature of their earnings pattern.
The data indicate that the aerospace group as a whole is now recognized as being
somewhat less risky from an earnings point of view than the automobile group, yet
remaining more so than the stable industries - tires and chemicals.
The Comparative Measure, z(t)
As explained earlier, the measure z(t) is the relative measure of the mar-
ket rate of profit to the rate actually earned on net worth. Throughout. this period
the market has bid-up the price of the chemical stocks such that the interest rate
on the market value is approximately 50% of the rate 5n the book value. (The con-
tribution of the financial performance of the du Pont company to this outcome should
be noted). This would indicate that the rate of return for group D. 2 (and group D. 1,
at the end of the period) as a whole is considerably greater than the return the mar-
ket expects on earnings with the associated risk. The ratio is considerably
larger, however, for the other industry groups considered here. It is also apparent
that the aerospace groups B and C have the highest values for the ratio z, while
the A-group maintains a value approximately equal to that for the auto-group.
The value of this ratio for the B-group decreased during the interval, but increased
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for groups A and C. This is logical considering the profit experience of the
firms which constitute each industry-group.
This measure indicates thatthe market rate of return is closer to the actual
rate of return for GroupsB and C than anyof the other industry-groups exained
here. This ranking, while providing no absolutemeasure of "excess" or "adequate",
does support thehypothesis that these aerospace firms, as awhole, probably experi-
enceda low profit rate compared to other firms in that their average rates of return
onnet worth were closer to the marginal rate. (The A-group, in its close-to-
medianposition couldbe said to have "average" experience in this regard. ) Con-
versely, there is nothing to indicate that aerospaceprofits, as a whole, were "ex-
cessive." (If for example, the rankings of the A andB-groups were interchanged
with that of D. 2, the aerospacegroup might necessarily be more defensive about
the profit outcomes.) Similarly, the data serve to rationalize the procuring
agencies efforts to raise margins during the later part of this time period.
Comments on Pricing on Return on Investment
The pricing of contracts with regard to the return on the capital invested
has considerable appeal for procurement officials. The Army Audit Agency has
strongly recommended this method of determining equitable contract prices; also
the Army Audit Agency Manual Part IV, (as quoted in Prof. Coughlin's study
m
/20_/) instructs the auditors to determine and report the rate of return which the
contractor is expected to earn on individual contracts. Our investigations have
also indicated that this subject is periodically investigated in numerous segments
of the procurement area, with the universal result that the method of pricing is
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recommended by the study-group only to be rejected by management decision as
being impracticable. A primary objection (there are others) appears to be the inde-
terminable estimate of the quantity of the capital employed on any given contract.
The previous discussion on cost of capital should indicate additional diffi-
culties with pricing based on return on investment. Most schemes for such pricing
imply that the rate of return would be based upon the interest rate - at least rates
not greatly different than fee-rates now used. The proper return on capital must
consider the cost of that eapital_ as stated, this cost is not the interest rate. If
the government acknowledges the criteria followed by management in this regard
(and it must in the end) the return on a given investment should not fall below
the cost of the capital, and the cost of capital varies with and is determined by the
market price of the stock. Thus the pricing of a contract would have the professed
e_]'_a_-|_r_:_ r_ _-_nt_.t-_-f|1_er .j-l_:_ n'l',_fJ_ eL'f _"_a c_'e_,la" _]'_'h_ nT-l_lrl_l"lo_ _'1 _ 11_|110" ._11_]_ _I rl1"io.irl_"
objective is questionable for a government agency. Furthermore, in situations in
which the capital fuInished is a mixture of debt and equity, the cost of capital does
not have an agreed upon method of determination. (The subject is presently the
center of'controversy among capital theorists). It is apparent, therefore, that
the negotiation of the cost of capital, in addition to the negotiation of the amount of
the capital (plus other topics typically covered) would probably complicate the con-
tract negotiations to an extent negating any benefit obtainable from a theoretically
more exact pricing procedure.
The profit rate is a function of numerous procurement actions and
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procedures _the frequency of the _rogress payments_15 the secured loans, as
well as the fee rate itself° If onewish to control the return on capital through the
fee policy alone, it would be necessary to control, or make allowance for, the
effects of the odmr procurement policies by which government contractors are
able to obtain a greater return on investment than is evidencedin the fee itself.
This would demanda capability for determining the net influence of a number of
procurement policies on the profit outcome - a practical impossibility.
There are other possible objections to a fee policy directed towards a spec-
ific return of capital. Present pricing is based upon a determination of the direct
costs (fairly unambiguous) and traditional, established overhead loadings. The
latter cost determinations receive constant scrutiny by the auditors, but in gen-
eral, it appears that the customary procedures lead to no particular controver-
sies. Pricing with regard to return on capital introduces specific items of
capital int_) the negotiation. Aside from the problem of obtaining agreement on
these items among the contracting parties_ the decisions in this regard becomes
open to scrutiny and of possible concern to the GAO and other groups with similar
interests. Any subject as controversial as the cost of capital is certain to invite
unwonted disagreements.
But further, assume that the cost of capital can be divided into that portion
15For example: In an interview with Dudley E. Brown, Lockheed Vice President,
{Aviation Week, 11 April 1966_ po 26}, he comments:
The defense industry used to turn over its cash perhaps four times a
year," .. o. "but now we may turn it over 250 times. But this gives
us considerably less flexibility than we used to have. So if a financial
officer hiccups and there's a delay in $1 million progress payment,
it can mean dislocation."
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obtained by debt capital andthat obtainedfrom equity capital. The payment for
cost of debt capital involves paymentfor interest, which government procure-
ment has tradition_Aly denied. Ignore, for the sakeof argument, the possible ob-
jections to covering interest payments in the fee as part of the cost of capital
rather than as items of cost. Controversial as the subject is at present, general
financial practice and concensusconsiders debt capital less costly than equity capital.
Therefore, the greater the amountof capital raised through borrowing, the smaller
the resulting fee_conversely, a firm with a higher percentage of equity capital
would receive a higher fee. This would eventually result inthe capitai structure of
16
the firm being subject to inquiry and possible criticism and negotiation. In addi-
tion, there are other factors producing the variations in the cost of capital. A
firm with uncertain earnings prospects (or high uncertainty of earnings) will have
a higher cost of capital, and vice versa. This_ in turn, could easily lead to
different rates being paid for the same product_ depending upon the firm selected.
If most of the technical and administrative problems invelved with pricing
on invested capital were resolved, there remains a final, unreso!ved and im-
portant issue - the one which led to the interest in this form of contract pricing
in the fiIst place. The minimal rate is not necessarily the :'_correct" rate. There
are numerous reasons why firms might not wish to accept investments with y_elds
as low as the marginal rate. But more impertant, the cost of capital does not
16
These remarks are quite applicable to an immediate and continuing contro-
versy as to whether interest payments should be pr:operly allowed as a con-
tract cost. If interest payments become a cost item, then those firms with
greater percentages of borrowed capital incur potential criticisms, along
with their cost and methods of financing.
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provide evena definitive base-point for contract fees unless all of the invest-
ment opportunities of the contractor are completely homogeneousas to risk and
the contractor accepts investment opportunities which yield downto the mar-
ginal rate o The contractor negotiates contract terms basedupon a subjective
density of cost outcomes and a utility function for fees. Although the latter may
(and should) be related to the cost of capital, the relationship will be undefinable
as will the subjective function upon which the contractor negotiates. At best, the
measurement of the cost of capital provides a complex method of arriving at an
initital bargaining position -- not the final one°
Summary and Conclusions
The first portion of the paper (Part I) examines a selected series of bal-
ance sheet items for selected industry groups. The data are time-series, and
the period 1954-1965 was chosen as representing the longest period occupied by
the aerospace industry as a mature "full-time"' supplier of weapon and space sys-
tems. The industries were selected from the top 100 contractors ranked accord-
ing to government sales and analysed as homogeneous subgroups - the A-group
being the _'large" aerospace firms; B-group, those firms with more than 90%
government sales_ D. 1, tire manufactures with less than 25% government sales,
etc. All further reference to groups will include those defined in Part I, p. 13.
The data analysed and presented in Part Ia illustrates characteristics of
the aerospace industry which have been noted before. It is well known and well
recited that margins are lower in the aerospace industry than in any of the other
industry groups equivalent in inherent technology and nature of production. This
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phenomena is evident here; the aerospace groups had lower margins by a consid-
erable amount than the "D-group" or those firms having a small percentage of
government sales. Most U.S. industries experienced a drop in margins through
this period (1954-65) and, of the industry groups examined herein, only the auto-
group indicates an increase.
Turnovers as measured on total assets appear to remain fairly stable for
most of the groups. They are the highest for A and B (approximately 3.0), and
lowest for the chemicals (approximately 1.0).
The aerospace industry remains one of the highest 'rlevered" groups in
terms of equity to total assets, but the ratio of equity to total assets appears to
be rising.
The return on equity capital, as measured in the traditional accounting
•_,_,_- ho_ ,_,_,-oo=,_,_ _,_. o11 n_' th_ indust_: o'v,n_m,q Sfl_di_d bp.tw_._.n '54 _nd '61
The return on equity remained at approximately the '61 rate thereafter, for
groups B and C i it declined for group D. I and rose for groups A, D. 2 and D. 3.
The B-group (firms with more than 90% government sales) indicates a stable
rate which, in turn, is evidence of the high percentage of government sales in
this group. The large "dip" in the profit rates for the A-group is explained by the
write-offs (taken by several of the firms) resulting from losses on non-government
sales. (Tl_is phenomena is particularly influenced by General Dynamics). If
allowance is made for this dip (which is pertinent in a paper primarily interested
in profit experiences on government sales) the rate of return for this group would
probably be quite similar to that for the B-group. At the end of the period, the
6O
chemical and auto industries were returning about 20%on equity, the A and B
groups_ about 15%, the Czgroup and the tire group about 10%.
The growth m the percentage of equity capital was greater for the B and
C groups than for the A-group, The former contain a greater proportion of smaller
firms, at least initially in the permd and the more rapid growth in equity from re-
tained earnings is to be expected.
This comparative study is necessary background for the objective of the paper.
However, one might make the observation that the profit outcomes of all the indus-
try groups are within the :rangeof profit objectives which were presented in Table
2. Also the profit outcomes for the aerospacegroups fall below the chemical and
auto industries but are higher than those for the tire group. Prima facie, it would
appear that the profits for the aerospace group were commensurate with other
industi:y during the period - but it would not be reasonable to expect the over all
outcome to be greatly different.
Part Ib was devoted to a measurement of a marginal rate of profit - a
profit rate limiting the manager"s acceptance of investment opportunities and,
therefore, a rate above which capital should be "attracted" to the industry. Theore_
tically, this marginal profit rate is subject to measurement (if with difficulty) and
would provide a reasonably definitive bench-mark for judgment of the profit out-
come. The emphasis, however, is on the rationale of examining the cost of capital
for the purpose of policy review of procurement actions. The actual measurement
of capital cost remains difficult and equivocal,
11ofor determining this statistic is exploratory°
niques of measuring capital cost should be made.
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and the method developed in section
FUrther investigation of tech-
A rate of return was determined on both the bock value and the market
value of the different industry-groups. The rankings in rates cf return on equity
were, generally slceaking, similar to those derived in Part I_ this is partially
explainable by the uniformity in the growth rates of earnings of four cf the industry
groups. Changes in ranking can be noted for those groups with high growth rates in
earnings - groups C and D. 3.
The cost of capital for the aerospace groups and the auto group were approxi-
mate!y the same at the beginning of the period° By the end of the time period, the
cost of capital had deczeased for the A and B grcups _c a pcsitmD between that of
the auto-group(D. 3) and the D. 1 and D. 2 groups. (The latter two groups, /t_res,
chemicalsT, representing mature industries with stable earnings patterns, have the
lowest cost of capital of the groups studied. ) This measured change in the cost of
capital indicates a decrease in the uncertainty attached to the _erosp_ce _arnings
by the m axket.
IYaIing this period the aerospace industry-group experienced rates of rerdrn
on investment cl,_ ser to the marginal rate than did the other groups. This ranking
lends support to certain conclusions. It would appear particularly difficult tc
argue that, on the average, the aerospace industry had "excessive" earnings if
their actual rate c_f earnings was closer to the capital cost than for any of the other
groups, especially at the end of the period. Similarly, it would appear that the
judgment of the government procuring agencies to raise fees through a multiplicity
of procurement actions is justified.
The investigations involving capita] cost lead to observations on the pricing
of contracts. Pricing schemes which base the contract fees upon the capital
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involved must obviously dependupon some appropriate rate of return. Many pro-
ponentsof this method of pricing appear to anticipate a rate of return not greatly
different from the interest rate. If the c:)ntract pricing philosophy is that of pay-
ing a "minimal" rate that would attract capital, this rate would, in all cases, be
higher (often muchhigher) than the interest rate. Furthermore, the rate would
necessarily vary with each contract and involve controversial negotiations on such
ambiguoustopics as the measure of the uncertainty of the cost outcome, the relation-
ship of this measure of uncertainty to that which the market places uponthe rest of
the firms earnings stream, etc. An estimate of the cost of capital adequatefor
managerial decision, or for use in evaluating procurement policy, is not an ideal
subject.for negc_tiation. Pricing formulae basedupon capital investment does not
appear to be adesirable development in government procurement.
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Measures of Profit Performance of
NASA Contract Award Receipients
by Patrick RossHuntley
Introduction
Whenever changes in NASA contract pricing and profits policies and/or
regulations are under consideration, the review that NASA officials engage in should
take into account the impact that contemplated changes will have on the financial health
of contractors accepting government business. This point is especially cogent with
regard to those contractors whose revenues derive primarily from government con-
tracts. These points do not go unnoticed by NASA officials, and indeed, even when
changes are not being considered, they are continually mindful of those influences
on contractors' financial positions that stem from NASA contracting practices.
These topics are critical parts of NASA officials' continuing interest in improving
upon existing contractor selection procedures.
Despite their keen interest, however, and despite also the considerable
counsel that NASA officials receive from many sources, they remain dissatisfied
with the present status of their pricing and profits policies. Doubtlessly this state
of affairs is partly a reflection of the difficulty persisting in the social and be-
haviorial sciences of finding statistics that will provide definitive, unambiguous
answers to basic questions. Moreover, quite understandably, NASA officials pre-
fer -- and hence seek out -- a statistic that is simple, albeit effective in providing
a basis for choosing among contractors.
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NASA's need for such a statistic is acute because its procurement neces-
sarily takes place in an unorganized market environment which lacks the competi-
tive mechanism for establishing an objective price. Owing to this lack of an ob-
jective basis for pricing, NASA must engage in price negotiation for contracts
awarded. Such a procedure introduces the necessity that NASA include profit
margins, i.e., fee payments, as part of the bargaining process. Inclusion of profit
margins provides NASA with an indirect link to an organized market that could yield
to some extent an objective basis for appraisal of NASA's use of funds.
This linkage involves the influence that NASA contracts could have on the
financial health of contract recipients through the impact of these contracts on their
cost of capital. Indeed, NASA's denial of contracts to a bidder might have an ap-
preciable influence on his cost of capital also, but this topic is not entertained herein
since, a priori, it appears to present considerable statistical complications to add to
an already complex question. Undoubtedly it should be explored later on.
This cost of capital question lies behind a standard suggested already for
1
dealing with the profit renegotiations problem. This problem resembles closely
the question concerning NASA's potential influence on an enterpriser's financial
health. Dissimilarities in these two "problems" are implicit in the discussion
below, but one important distinction warrants explicit recognition at this point;
profit renegotiation involves an ex post examination of statistics and fact whereas.
1jacoby, Nell H., and Weston, J. Fred, "Profit Standards for Renegotiation,"
Procurement and Profit Renegotiation, Weston, ed., ,(Wadsworth Publishing
Company, Inc., San Francisco: 1960), pp. 121-58. Also, Jacoby and Weston,
"Profit Standards," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXVI, (May 1952}, pp.
224-50.
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in contrast, NASA's contract negotiation places it in the position of assisting m
the entrepreneurial decision making -- ex ante view. Despite this seemingly signi-
ficant difference in the two problems, the profit renegotiation standard evolved by
Jacoby and Weston based on the cost of capital concept affords possibilities for
utilization on the NASA contract profit negotiation problem. Its adaptation is explored
in this paper.
The adapted form of the profit renegotiation standard owing to Jacoby and
Weston is labeled the C/A ratio m this studvo It is a simple concept that relates a
conceptualized quantity called calculated earnings to the actual earnings of a speci-
fied period. The calculated earnings are those that ought to exist if a certain stand-
ard is to be attained. That standard is based on the feasibility of obtaining equity
financing by an enterprise in order to expand its operations. Inherently equity financ-
ing involves the cost of capital concept. Moreover, in setting out as a criterion for
a good profit standard the requirement that equity financing be a feasible alternative
to other financing arrangements, maintenance of capital value is implicit. Finally,
the question may be raised as to the propriety of a government agency making use
of the cost of capital concept as basis for formulation of policy with respect to fee
payment on contract awards.
These questions are given some attention in section II of the paper which
discusses the equity financing concept° But as observed therein, the adapted
measurement, i. e°, the C/A ratio, lacks an absolute interpretation so that an
empirical approach involving comparative analysis was required. Findings from
the comparisons are presented and discussed in section HI. Conclusions and re-
commendations appear in section IV.
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II. The Equity Financing Concept
Essentially the equiW financing standard for measuring the adequacy of pro-
fits asserts the fundamental propriety of and need for profit rates being sustained at
a high enough level to meet two conditions that are necessary in order to assure the
continuing operation of an enterprise. First, the rates must provide incentive to
assure that. the existing equity claimants will maintain their share-claim on the
assets on the enterprise° Secondly, whenever expansion is necessary, these rates
must be great enough to induce further equity capital contributions from either the
present equity claimants or from external sources without eroding the equity-claim
status of the present owners of the enterprise. These fundamental features of the
equity financing concept, through aggregation of enterprises, may be applied to the
industry in which the enterprises classify. It is convenient, however, to continue
the discussion of the theoretical aspects of the equity financing concept in terms of
the enterprise level, leaving the inclusion of the industry level matters for the
empzicial pcrtion of the paper.
Viewed differently, it is clear that the equiW financing standard evokes
the basic principle of a free enterprise economy; if ex post for a period the profits
of an enterprise are too low relative to profits generally, then ex ante the next
period the owners of the enterprise will attempt to disentangle their equity capital
and potential owners w ill be altered to the fact that they can employ their capital
to advantage elsewhere. Giving statistical content to this process is no easy matter:
of necessity decisions are made ex ante, but data with which one must work pro-
vide ex post measurements of such decisions. Moreover, these ex post measure-
67
ments are not confined to pure results of the decision makers and the forces of
nature combine to exert considerable influence on the outcomes of their decisions.
These observations about the equity financing standard for profit allowance
were converted into concrete terms by Jacoby and Weston. /Supra, the first
citation. 7 Their specific contribution was to formulate a procedure that permits the
ex post data to be adapted into a statistic that is of some use in drawing inferences
about the ex ante decision.
A. Quantifying the Concept
This decision making by both potential and existing owners of an enterprise
on whether to engage their free capital or to expand their already engaged capital
investment is based in part on objective evidence and in part on subjective judg-
ment of the earning prospects for the enterprise. Doubtlessly some equity capital
investors look to a plethora of statistics about the enterprise, as well as other
enterprises, in order to infer what the objective evidence indicates_ perhaps others
use no more than a couple of statistical measurements that suggest the relative
earning potential of the enterprise.
Both approaches to decision making are too extreme under most circum-
stances. Certainly they are too extreme for NASA's interest, and they are too
extreme for the profits renegotiation standard in which Jacoby and Weston were
interested. An interim position is provided by the equity financing standard which
they evolved. It was chosen for examination in this study for the reason that, in
essence, it is a simple criterion that makes use of a few strategic economic vari-
ables; hence, it is manageable while being relatively informative. It incorporates
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elements of both objective and subjective bases for equity investors' decision
making°
1. The model. -- Equity capital claimants of an enterprise are influenced
in their decision on whether to leave their capital at the disposition of the enter-
prise by its history of earnings and its history of dividend yields. This knowledge
about individuals' decision making is a basis for generalizing a social model for
appraising how an enterprise is faring in some year, t_. For that matter, a more
aggregated model permits a similar inferential process for an industry or any other
grouping of enterprises°
The procedure involves comparing the actual earnings in yeart with what the
earnings would have to be in order to support the enterprise's historical practice
on dividend payout from earnings and its average earnings experience. This is
tantamount to saying that actual earnings are to be compared with an artifical,
hypothesized earnings value. The latter is arrived at by formula and called cal-
culated earnings° The calculation procedure is this: (15 Begin with the residual
value of the assets of the enterprise which reflect the aggregate cf owner's
equity claims, adjusted to current dollar replacement cost° (2) Multiply that value
by the average percentage dividend yield for some specified time period, i.e., say
the previous decade, to obtain the calculated dividends. (35 Divide the calculated
dividends by the average payout ratio of dividends from earnings that has obtained
over the same time period in order to obtain the calculated earnings, after taxes,
for the year of interest, t.
These three steps are the mechanical reversing of the process by which
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yield andpayout rates are ascertained initially. Combining andexpressing
these three steps algebraically, calculated earnings has this formula:
1
C = VY P (Z)
with the symbols for the terms meaning:
C - calculated _fter tax earnings for any specified period, t,
V - value of the assets representing the residual calim of equity investors, adjusted
to period t dollars,
VZ- average percentage dividend yield fer the decade terminating at end of any
period t,
- average payout ratio of dividends from earnings for period applying to Yo
Certain other algebraic relationships prove useful in keeping thought
straight on the implication of the equity financing principle for a profit standard:
t
=:£: Y/lO (2)
t-9
t
(3)
t-9
Y = D/M (4)
P = D/A (5)
The additional symbols are for the concepts: D- indicating periodic mount of
dividend payments, M - market value of the equity claims, i.e., M -f_ V, and A
- actual earnings for any period t.
2. The C/A ratio and its interpretation. -- The comparison of calculated
earnings with actual earnings was made by Jacoby and Weston through the mech-
anism of the rate-of-return. This is achieved by dividing both the C value and the
m
7O
A value by equity capital invested andthen comparing those results.
Following suchprocedure it canbe said that if the rate basedon C is
greater than that based on A, the earnings in period t are too low c_mpared
with their historical level° Direct comparison of C andA permits the same
conclusion, however, and indeedthey canbe comparedby placing them together
as a ratio. If the ratio, with C in the numerator, stands higher than 1_1, the
actual earnings for the period are too low in contrast to the experience over the
preceding decade° Moreover', a still more explicit statement about the ratio
canbe made. If, for example, the C/A ra£io stands at. 1.5:1 in period t, actual
earnings were inadequateby fifty per cent what would have beennecessary to
support the enterprise's ten-year experience in regard to its dividend payments
relative to the level of equity claims on assets, V.
Alternatively the interpretation goes: if the averagepercentage dividend
yield andthe averagepayout ratio were to be adhered to in period t, the dividend
payment would include in part a return of capital alongwith a return on capital.
For such an outcomem persist over any extendedtime period would mean the
2
erosion of the equit__capital base.
2
This point is n_:_tobvious, and so some elaboration is indicated: given that A is fall-
ing, period-by-period, but that despite this fact the enterprise desires to maintain
Y and P equal to their ten-year averages. (It must bekept in mind that the enter-
prise can control only the P concept, but it can strive to bring about a particular
• value of Y. ) This means that dividends ( = D) fall continually since P is a constant
percentage of a continually falling A. But Y is calculated from two elements, D and
M. (Formula (4)_. Therefore M must fall continually since Y is constant and D is
falling. With M falling, even in the face of V (=book value_ rising, the price at
which any individual can dispose of his capital claim is falling continually, i.e.,
the equity capital base is eroding. This question is considered in more detail in
appendix A.
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In the event that the actual after tax earnings were to take on zero or nega-
tive values, the C/A ratio would become incalculable or it would become negative.
In either circumstance, interpretation of the ratio lacks preciseness, but in such
cases its interpretation is unnecessary: a priori the earnings are unsatisfactory.
3. Composition of owners' equity. -- It is apparent from (17 that the
makeup of V has an appreciable impact on determination of C. Therefore, deciding
the content of V cannot be taken lightly. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this under-
taking, deciding on the particulaz items constituting equity claims on the assets of
the enterprise can be disposed of easily. Preferred stock claims on the assets of
the companies studied were excluded from the definition of equity claims along with
the external claims of conventional classification. This classification appears justi-
fied for two reasons: (1) senior securities such as preferred stocks are often re-
garded as more properly classified along with bonds since they have many features
in common, and (2) they occupy, by and large, a relatively small portion of claim s
on total assets for the companies dealt with herein.
In addition to this deliberate exclusion of preferred stock from equity claims,
such items as surplus accounts and capital reserve accounts were treated as though
holders of common stocks had exclusive rights to exercise these claims on assets.
This is not entirely justified in all instances, but this procedure made the con-
ducting of the study simpler and for that reason was followed. Moreover, the per-
centage change in equity claims resulting from these ci:assification assumptions was
not large.
4. Valuation of assets. -- Most classes of assets used by businessmen turn
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frequently enough so that their valuation typically is expressed in cuI0rent dollars, io e.,
their valnes are not influenced sppreciably by the changing value of the dollar.
This is not strictly true with :respect to inventories, but the extent to which actual
value and current year prices of inventories do differ should be unimportant for
present purposes°
In contrast to these assets, however, the value of fixed assets as they are conven-
tionally carried on the books oiten displays a pronounced variation from valuation of
these assets in replacement dollars. By far the largest categcry of fixed assets
is the class called depreciable assets, i. eo, man made assets. This category is
feasible of adjustment to ieflect periodic changes m the costs of installing reproduc-
ible capita, and that was done in the study. To accomplish this, use was made of
a U.S. Department of Commerce study covering the valuatmn of stocks of manufac,
tutors' depreciable assets° 3 That study makes available the value of stocks of
depreciable assets ior major manufacturmg groups expressed in both historical cost
dollars and in 1954 base constant: cost dollars. The histc_rical dollar valuation is
often called boCk value_ the 1954 dollar cost reflects the approximate cost of re-
placing an existing stuck of depreciable assets at 1954 prices.
After making the adjustment in the valnation of depreciable assets to ex-
press their values in current dollars, i. eo, the replacement cost dollars for the
year of interest, it is concluded that the equity claims total, V, is expressed in
3Huntley, P.R., Capital Assets: The Wellspring for Economic Growth, forth-
coming monograph of the :Business and Defense Services Administration. )
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4
terms of current dollars.
B. The Cost of Capital
5
By substituting (4) and (5), properly weighted, into (2) and (3) and then
those results into (1), a new expression for C emerges:
t t t t
C = V(_D/ _" M){ _.A/ _ D)_
t-9 t-9 t-9 t-9
(6)
which can be reduced still further to.
C = V {A/M) (7)
where A and M have been substituted for the summation of A and the summation of
M. And what this reformulation of the definition of C make clear is that it is
based on one notion of the cost of capital. One authority, for example, asserts
quite positively that there is only one good measurement of the cost of capital
6
concept although one other is reasonably acceptable if used prudently. Professor
Solomon uses Ea/P as the appropriate measure of the cost of capital although he
finds the E/P ratio marginally acceptable in some situations. His E stands for
w
current earnings, which is nearly the same as A used in (7)_ it lacks the averaging
process used here as suggested by the Jacoby-Weston procedure. His E a stands for
anticipated earnings, and P is for the price of a share of common stock. Thus, his
P is the same in substance as M of (7) above, for dividing M by the number of shares
4 Some problems in making this monetary valuation adjustment are discussed
in appendix B.
5 If (4) and (5) were used as they appear with implicit weights of each year's D/M
and D/A ratios being equal, (6) would be: C=V (D/M) (D/A) o This form, in
addition to weighting the ratios improperly, does not lend itself to the further
simplification under discussion nor does it yield a clearcut interpretation of the
measurement of the cost of capital concept.
6 Solomon, Ezra, "Measuring A Company's Cost of Capital," Journal of Business
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, : Oct. 1955); reprinted in The Manage-
ment of Corporate Capital, E. Solomon, edo, (The Free Press of Glencoe,
Chicago: 1959) , p. 131.
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of common st_ck outstanding would yield Solomon's Po
What thedistinction between these cost of capital concepts reduces to is
si_mplythis: Jacobyand Weston select a concept that affords statistics, i. e°,
theirs is an ex post view in which several year's results are averaged in order to
eliminate someof the effects of irregularities whereas Solomonsettles on the cost
of capital conceptthat is theoretically correct but immeasurable directly. In fact
it is in the mind of the entrepreneur. Solomon's approach is ex ante and requires
a crystal, ball cra forecast of earnings_this point tends te invalidate its use for
a profit standard in government contracts, but this inference call.s for comment.
C. Propriety ef Government Decisions Related to Cost of Capital
Entrepreneurial managementof an enterprise is performing its proper function in
decision making for the firm when it estimates revenue for the future and trans-
lates that revenue into the enterprise's cost of capital., following Solomon, in order
to decide whether to seek out the sources of that, particular revenue stream. There:-
fore, the entrepreneur is correct in choosing the Ea/P ratio for such decision
making. That is, the entrepreneur bases his decision on cost of capital ex ante.
On the other hand, the government is not responsible for such risk-taking
decisions, but rather has the responsibility of insuring that in the long-I_n there
will be resources available to meet its needs. Therefore it needs to avoid the
use of the ex ante earnings concept and settle for a good indicator of what has been
an acceptable earnings level in the industry in which it will place a contract°
Moreover, to the government taking the social, view on equity capital, it should
make use of V rather than M as the measure of equity capital since V reflects the
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summation of inputs existing m the creation of productive capitalo Restated, the
government -- being NASA in this instance -- should evaluate equity capital through
measurement of the inputs that provided it; the entrepreneur should regard equity
capital as the market discounted value of future revenues.
D. Significance of the C/A Ratio_ Basis of Comparative Analysis
The meaning of the numerical values of the C/A ratio that may be attained
is given interpretation above, but it must be acknowledged that the desriable level
of the ratio, between 0:1 and 1:1, cannot be expected to persist period after period.
Certainly it is a reasonable expectation that this ratio's values will vary through
time as do most other statistics on any type variable used for business analysis.
Even though values of the statistic were calculated for a decade or more, one would
not know what sort of trend to expect nor what might be considered a stable level
for the ratio to achieve. The uniqueness of the measurement makes findings on its
numerical value difficult of specific interpretation, and consequently resort must
7
be had to some other basis of comparison.
In light of these observations, it would seem, a priori, that an enterprise
of interest should have its statistic on the ratio of calculated to actual earnings
compared with the same statistic calculated for some appropriate base enterprise
or base industry. Moreover, still owing to the uniqueness of the statistic being
worked-up herein, one does not know in advance what to expect of such statistic
. There is an exception to this observation: a priori, for the longrun the ratio
must stand below unity and above zero_ On the other hand, if a firm could
obtain capital consistently through non-equity financing, it might survive in
the long-run indefinitely.
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for base companiesthat ought to provide a standard for the comparisons. There-
fore it seems desirable to composea group of "standard" companies to serve as
a base of comparison. Choosingthese companies is problematic, nevertheless, for
one can think of many criteria that the base companies should meet in order to be
regarded as appropriate for becoming the base on which to judge the NASA con-
tractor's performance with respect to their C/A ratio values.
Desirable characteristics of the companies of comparison would be that on
external grounds for judgment they are knownto be (1) financially sound, (2) are
experiencing considerable growth in economic activity, and (3) their structural
makeup is quite similar to that of the NASA contractors. Onthe other hand, in
considering the last listed characteristic, one can imagine that comparison of the
NASAcontractors with a base group that exhibits quite dissimilar structural
characteristics might be worthwhile -- perhaps more informative than the former
case.
The listing of desirable characteristics for companies to be included in the
standard companies group for comparison with the group of NASA contractors is
quite extendable. Moreover, in virtually no instance can one expect to find com-
panies that have many of these characteristics in common with the NASA contrac-
tors. So to include many characteristics as test criteria would require that a con-
siderable number of companies be included in the standard companies group. That
was not possible in conducting the current project, of course, so selection of the
companies to compose the standard companies group proceeded pragmatically.
All choices were made so that only companies with readily accessible data
in conveniently arranged form were included. Some companies were chosen
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because it is knowna prior____ithat they and/or the industry to which they classify are
successful; other companies were selected because they and their industry have
long survived in the private, commercial world. Some choices were made to intro-
duce companies that are close alternative users of the same critical resources that
are required by NASA contractors. Altogether the companies included for this
analysis consistof the NASA group whose activities are almost exclusively aerospace
or a closely related type contracting activity, four companies from the automobile
industry, three companies in the chemical mdustry_ three companies in the rabber
tire industry, and three companies in the stone-clay-glass industry. 8
This selection of standard companies affords an additional benefit to the
analysis. The aggregate group of standard companies can be subdivided into in-
dustry groups that can be compared one-by-one with the NASA contractors. Possi-
ble advantages from this procedure are patent.
E. Expected Relationship between the C/A Ratio and the Debt-Equity Ratio
The Jacoby-West_n arg-ament, ext_ ressed in terms consistent with the C/A
ratio used herein, asserts that a C/A ratio of greater than 1:1 predicts the findings
9
of a high debt-eqaaity ratio. Once again, of course, what constitutes a high or a
low or a typical numerical level for the debt-equity ratio is relative; it can be
evaluated only by comparisons On the other hand, differing from the C/A ratio,
debt-equity ratios b_aye been used infinancial analysis f: r many years, and hence
there are some empirically established ideas about what c_nstitutes a high or a !ow
8 The term industry is used in the broad, ncnspecific sense of common parlance
rather than according to strict cIassification by the Standard IndustriM Classi-
fication Manual published by the Office of Statistical Standards.
9 Jacoby and Weston, op. cit., p o 131.
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debt-equity ratio. Nevertheless, it remains true that the level of the ratio for
any companytends to fluctuate during the course of major changes in business
activities as well as in accord with the net direction resulting from numerous
changesin business activities.
Drawing further from the Jacoby-Weston findings, adaptation of their table
9-110 gives a C/A ratio of 1.26:1 for the aircraft industry, 11 and accordingly "pre-
dicts" a higher debt-equity ratio for aircraft than for manufacturing as a whole. The
prediction is realized, for the two debt-equity ratios are: 1.45:1 and 0.48:1. These
two authors, two of the most expert in the field of financial economics, discuss the
significance of sucha relatively high debt-equity ratio. (1:45:1}. They observe that
a numerical value as high as that of their calculations should concord with an in-
dustry characterized by stable, thoughtending to be low, earnings relative to invest-
ment. 12 Sucha relationship prevails in thepublic utility industries. But, they
observe further, stable earnings are not the experience of the aircraft companies,
13
andtherefore an alternative explanation is required. Lastly, they point out that
high debt-equity ratios showup for new firms, especially when entering a develop-
14
ing industry, andfor small firms.
The aircraft industry, viz., the NASA contractors' group, was at that time
composedof relatively new firms engagingin a new, developing industry, and it
10 Ibid., p. 129.
11 Aircraft industry as studiedby Jacoby andWeston in the mid-1950's has a high
degreeof concordancewith the NASA contractors' group of this study.
12 Jacoby and Weston, op. cit., p. 131.
13 Ibid., p. 133.
14 Ibid., p. 131.
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contained many small firms -- nonewere really large. (At the present, the same
statement is substantially true.) Therefore, it is not surprising to nete in the
findings reported below in section III that the relationship between the C/A ratio
for the NASAcompanies' group and the relative levels of the debt-equity ratios of
the NASA group and the standard companies is not far different from the Jacoby-
Weston findings.
IH. Empirical Findings
This section reports the results of calculating the C/A ratio discussed in
Section II. In addition, since Jaeoby and Weston stress the significance of thei_
findings on the equity financing statistics in comparison with debt-equity ratios
and payout rates, those topics are dealt with herein also. Then the findings are
given a summary interpretation.
A. C/A Findings
The ratio of calculated earnings to actual earnings (C/A ratio) is presented
in table 1 below for (1) the NASA contractors, (2) the aggregate of standard com-
panies, and (3) separately for each sub-group of standard companies that classify
as an industrial activity. The ratios presented are composites for each group,
one labeled the simple mean and the other weighted mean. The latter might be
regarded alternatively as the aggregate ratio rather than the weighted mean since
they are algebraically equivalent.
Deciding which mean to choose for evaluating the status of an "industry" as
measured by the C/A ratio is problematic. The simple mean is the arithmetic
average of all C/A ratios of the group for which calculation is performed. There-
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Table i. -- Ratio of Calculated Earnings to Actual Earnings for
Aggregate of NASA Contractors, Aggregate of Standard Companies,
and Aggregates of the Separate Industrial Groups Composing the
Standard Companies Group, Ten-Year Periods
Terminating in 1953 and 1963
Company Grou_ I C/A Ratio 2
1963 1958a 1953 a
NASA Contractors:
Simple mean 3 .............................................. 1.23 1.64 1.00
Weighted mean 3 ............................................ 0.80 1.31 1.05
Aggregate of Standard Companies:
Simple mean .............................................. 0.81 1.36 0.71
Weighted mean ............................................. 0.51 1.13 0.46
Rubber Companies:
Simple mean .............................................. 1.46 2.11 1.04
Weighted mean ............................................ 1.21 1.89 1.03
Chemical Companies:
Simple mean ............................................... 0.50 1.51 0.36
Weighted mean ............................................ 0.31 0.53 0.28
Automobile Companies:
Simple mean ............................................... 0.71 1.95 0.57
Weighted mean ............................................. 0.56 1.42 0.45
Stone-Clay-Glass Companies:
Simple mean ................................................ 0.61 0.90 0.88
Weighted mean ............................................. 0.43 0.83 0.72
i. Companies composing each group can be identified from table 2.
2. C/A ratio discussed in text and formula for C, caluculated earnings provided in (i).
. Simple mean is the arithmetic average of C/A ratios for companies contained in the
aggregation. Weighted mean is the ratio of the summation of the C values for all
companies in each aggregation to the summation of the A values in that aggregation.
The weighted mean gives the larger companies greater influence on the value of the
composite C/A ratio.
a. Group of automobile companies excludes Ford Motor Company for periods prior to 1963
since it was not an open corporation until 1954. This exclusion has no appreciable
effect, however, for the C/A ratios in 1963 with Ford excluded are: (i) Simple mean-
0.62 and (2) WeiBhted mean - 0.40.
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission Form lO-K's, Moody's Industrial M_nuals,
and Standard and Poor's Corporations.
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fore each C/A ratio of the group is treated as equal to all others in terms of
importance. In contrast, the weighted mean is the ratio of the s_unrned C values
to the summed A values. This is equivalent to stating that each C/A ratio is
weighted by the relative size of its A value. Therefore, for an industry dominated
by one or two companies, one should expect the weighted mean to agree fairly closely
with the C/A value of the largest company -- or two -- while the simple mean would
differ appreciably unless all companies of the industry tends to have the same C/A
value. That is, if the industry is composed of homogeneous companies, the simple
mean and the weighted mean would be nearly the same and would reflect accurately
the C/A ratios of all companies in the industry (or group}.
This latter result appears only twice: in 1953 for both the NASA con-
tractors and the rubber companies. In both instances the companies were indeed
-- _-1_ J,_,- _ _._,_o _._j, their
divergence in homogeneity is manifest in size differences that have developed since
1953. NeveEtheless, the rubber companies remain near enough the same size both
in terms of total assets and in terms of equity capital so that no one company dom-
inates. Hence, in 1963 the weighted mean of the C/A ratios for these companies
more nearly matches the C/A ratio of the middle sized company -- Goodrich.
On the other side of this story, in the automobile and chemical groups one
firm exceeds in size the summation of all others included in the groups of this
study. This dominance shows up in the C/A composite means. C/A values for
General Motors and du Pont appear in table 2 and evidently are close to the values
of their respective weighted means of table 1.
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Table 2. -- Ratio of Calculated Earnings to Actual Earnings for Individual
Companies Composing the Group of NASA Contractors and the Aggregate of
Standard Companies, Ten-Year Periods terminating in 1953, 1958, and 1963
Company (industry Group) C/A Ratio I
1963 1958 1953
NASA Contractors:
Boeing (Aerospace) 2 ...................................... 1.36 1.61 0.99
United (Aerospace) 3 ...................................... 1.24 0.99 1.40
North American (Aerospace) ............................... 0.71 1.02 0.99
General Dynamics (Aerospace) ............................. 0.35 0.99 0.98
Lockheed (Aerospace) 3 ................................... 0.43 1.39 1.09
Douglas (Aerospace) 3 .................................... 0.74 1.80 0.99
McDonnell (Aerospace) ................................... 0.71 1.46 1.88
Northrup (Aerospace) ..................................... 2.33 1.35 0.34
Republic (Aerospace) ..................................... 3.60 3.26 0.66
Grumman (Aerospace) ...................................... 0.83 2.58 0.70
Standard Companies:
General Motors Corporation (Automobile) 2 ................. 0.38 1.26 0.41
Ford Motor Company (Automobile) .......................... 0.99 2.32 a
E.I. du Pont (Chemical) 2 ................................. 0.23 0.44 0.25
Union Carbide (Chemical) ................................. 0.43 0.55 0.32
Chrysler Motors (Automobile) ............................. 0.52 b 0.64
0.86 1.59 0.95Firestone (Rubber) ......................................
Goodrich (Rubber) ....................................... 1.22 1.46 0.98
Olin-Matheson (Chemical) ................................ 0.85 3.55 0.51
United States Rubber (Rubber) ............................ 2.28 3.29 1.19
Borg-Warner (Automobile) ................................. 0.98 2.28 0.65
Libby-Owen-Ford (Stone, clay, glass)_ ..................... 0.51 0.97 0.71
Corning (Stone, clay, glass) .... •........................ 0.20 0.46 0.48
Anchor-Hocking (Stone, clay, glass) ...................... 1.12 1.26 1.46
b.
Source:
i. See table i, footnote 2.
2. Companies ranked within NASA group and within Standard group by size of equity
capital claims in 1963. Companies specifically designated by this footnote are
largest companies in their own industrial groupings.
3. These companies typically experience between sixty and eighty-nine per cent of
their revenue deriving from the Federal Government; all other NASA contractors on
this list experience more than ninety per cent of their revenues from government
sources. See: Standford Research Institute, The Industry-Government Aerospace
Relationship, Vol. II, pp. 90-91.
a. Could not be calculated since Ford Motors was not an open corporation until 1954.
Similarly, the 1958 C/A ratio is not based on ten-year yield and payout data as
is so for other companies.
Could not be calculated meaningfully since Chrysler had a loss in 1958 -- a nega-
tive value for A would obtain.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Standard and Poor, and Moody: see source
of table i.
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Of much interest is the fact that for almost every pair of measurements
the weighted mean is lower.
cluded in section II, A. 2.
A Iower C/A ratio is a more desirable result as con-
Therefore, it can be inferred that those companies
that are dominating the industry groups in which they are classified herein are per-
forming better and have performed better for approximately one and a half decades
than have the other companies in their groups. It is notable, also, that all industry
groups experienced a worsening of the C/A ratio in 195_ and then a substantial
improvement m 1963, some in fact improving their positien over 1953. With few
exceptions, this statement applies to the individual companies as well.
H as implied above, the weighted mean is more meaningful for measuring a
group's performance in terms of the behavior of its C/A ratio, it is clear that the
1963 NASA contractors were earning above what their historical patterns would pre-
dict. Moreover, the NASA contractors have improved their earnings position
relative to the standard companies. Indeed, they have gained on two industries that
are main-stays of the economy -- automobiles and chemicals -- .albeit these in-
dustries still have C/A ratio composites that are appreciably lower than that of
the NASA group.
Meriting comment also, perhaps, is the fact that the automobile group,
characterized by a demand schedule that is dominated by individual consumers,
experienced more pronounced variation in its C/A ratio from 1953-1958-1963 than
did the NASA contractors who face one large, sophisticated buyer. The same
observation applies to the rubber companies whose demand is in large part a com-
plement of the automobile demand. Moreover, the latter is the only commercial
group that does not display a "favorable" C/A ratio. This dispels the possible
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hypothesis that industries whose sales are dominated by purchases from individual
consumers necessarily fare better by the C/A ratio measurement.
Alternatively, one might be misled into hypothesizing that the C/A ratio is
a function of size of companies since the automobile and chemical groups present
suchlow C/A ratios in 1953and 1963. The stone-clay-glass group, by 1963, com-
pares favorably with those two groups, however, and its companies' sizes approxi-
mate those of the smaller aerospace companies. Componentsof its demandare
quite diverse althoughstrongly influenced by individual consumer demandas is
automobile demand. But its marketing arrangements are structured quite differently.
Perhaps the tentative conclusion canbe set forth that the stone-clay-glass companies,
being involved in both basic manufacturing operations as well as consumer oriented
manufacturing, experience a muchmore stable demand. Therefore their growth
requirements are less --(can be satisfied easily by internal sources) and at once
investors in their stocks do not anticipate spectactular gains.
In sum, the statistics of table 1, supportedby table 2 for finer interpre-
tations, suggest that in years prior to 1963, the aerospace industry was securing
earnings that stoodhigh enoughrelative to other industries so that the market re-
flected a high appraisal of the value of equity capital in its companies. That is to
say, the market anticipated
they would gain still more.
that earnings would remain relatively high or that
Unless the 1964-66 statistics alter this C/A value,
0.80, it canbe concludedthat NASAhas not donebadly by these contractors in its
fee payments.
B. Debt-Equity Ratios
The 1953C/A value in table 1 and the individual C/A ratios of table 2 do
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not support quite so dismal a conclusion as that implied in the analysis of Jacoby
and Weston with respect to the earning s position of the {then} aircraft industry.
Their conclusion, in contrast to the present study, was applicable to the entire in-
dustry, and this may have some influence on the differences between their results
15
and those herein. On the other hand, the conclusions emerging from this study
cannot be regarded as favorable for the year 1953 either.
They stress that such an undesirable earnings level "predicts" a high debt-
equity ratio for the aircraft industry. To inquire further into their conclusion, table
3 was drawn up to provide debt-equity ratios for selective, critical years. Their com-
parison, 1944-53 average, had the debt-equity ratio of the aircraft industry sub-
stantially higher than the ratio for all manufacturing companies. (1.45 -- 0.48:1)
Table 3 indicates that such relationships exist for the single year 1953, comparing
ten aerospace companies with selected manufacturing companies. The composite,
not shown in the table, is 2.06:1 for the aerospace group and 0.87:1 for standard
companies. (1.59:1 and 0.70:1 for 1958; 1.46:1 and 0.66:1 in 1963).
Despite this apparent agreement of these findings on the debt-equity ratio
with the earlier findings by Jacoby and Weston, too strong and positive conclus-
ions must be guarded against. The significance of debt-equity ratios can be over-
emphasized, for the debt-equity position of small companies engaging in large
contracts is sensitive to variations in the company's earnings. This can be seen
in table 3 for General Dynamics. Its 1961 - 1962 debt-equity ratios display such
15 It might be objected that their examination was not actually representative of
the entire industry, for as a practical matter they adjusted V, i.e., book
value, of all firms by using a ratio of current dollar values to historical
dollar values which they obtained from only three large companies.
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Table 3. -- Debt-Equity Rations for Individual Companies Composing the Group of
NASA Contractors and the Aggregate of Standard Companies, Selected years,
1953-1963
Company I 1963 1962 1961 1958 1957 1956 1953
NASA Contractors:
Boeing ....................... 1.50 1.40 1.26 2.00 1.75 1.23 1.82
United ...................... 1.18 i.i0 1.01 0.69 i.i0 1.12 1.30
North American .............. 1.53 1.77 1.45 0.69 1.05 1.56 2.28
General Dynamics ............. 1.91 4.08 9.73 1.37 1.53 2.06 1.96
Lockheed ..................... 1.60 2.28 3.03 2.72 2.61 2.43 2.30
Douglas ...................... 1.57 1.77 1.74 1.68 1.41 1.33 1.77
McDonnell ................... 1.05 0.79 0.71 2.37 2.84 1.68 1.94
Northrup ..................... 1.30 1.03 1.07 1.71 1.83 1.62 2.68
Republic ..................... 1.00 1.13 0.85 0.97 0.57 i.ii 3.20
Grumman ...................... 1.95 1.34 1.29 1.71 0.66 0.75 1.32
Standard Companies:
General Motors ............... 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.53 0.63
Ford Motor Company ........... 0.60 0.58 0.64 0.38 0.45 0.40 ..
duPont ........................ 0.23 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.32
Union Carbide ................ 0.63 0.67 0.70 0.78 0.73 0.80 0.84
Chrysler ..................... 1.31 0.98 0.97 0.94 1.04 1.00 0.58
Firestone .................... 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.51 0.69 0.74 0.89
Goodrich ..................... 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.40 0.40 0.46 0.94
Ohlin-Matheson ............... 1.08 1.12 i.ii 1.24 1.19 0.93 0.97
U.S. Rubber .................. 1.02 0.96 1.44 1.74 1.53 1.96 2.07
Borg-Warner .................. 0.33 0.34 0.49 0.36 0.44 0.49 0.55
Libby-Owen-Ford .............. 0.ii 0.ii 0.ii 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.27
Corning ..................... 0.26 0.33 0.37 0.59 0.48 0.55 1.88
Anchor-Hocking ............... 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.43 0.46 0.50 0.62
i. Companies ranked within their espective groups by size of equity capital claims
in 1963. More detailed information about companies in footnote 2, table 2.
Source: Calculated from balance sheet data contained on Form 10-K reports to
Securities and Exchange Commission.
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pronounced differences from its ratios of other years owing to the
fact that the company experienced a substantial loss in 1961• This loss
reduced appreciably the equity level of General Dynamics. But even in a
larger company, losses may result in some variation in debt-equity ratio
values; an example in the same table is Chrysler.
These findings attest to the need for exercising caution in the use of
debt-equity ratios in analysis of this type• Suggested further is the thought
that the debt-equity ratios are too responsive to irregularities that may stem
from accounting pecularities to be of any special use•
C. Some Components of the C/A Ratio
Following their debt-equity conclusion, Jacoby and Weston suggest
that the higher debt-equity ratio of the aircraft industry may be owing to
"excessive" payout ratios. They find that this hypothesis is not confirmed
by the statistics, for all manufacturing companies, had a higher payout ratio
than did aircralt. This same conclusion holds for the NASA contractors
relative to the standard companies; the statistics are given in table 4.
Each of the larger of the standard companies, down through Union
Carbide, had higher payout ratios for each year than all NASA contractors
almost without exception. The ratio for the other standard companies also
tends to be greater than for the aerospace companies. These findings, then,
are consistent with those from Jacoby and Weston. So, to the extent that the
debt-equity ratios are meaningful as they suggest, the high level in the
aerospace industry is not to be accounted for by high payout rates.
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Table 4. -- Payout from Actual Earnings and Yield on Market Value of Equity
Capital for Individual Companies Composing the Group of NASA Contractors
and the Aggregate of Standard Companies, Ten-year Periods terminating
in 1953, 1958 and 1963
Company Payout Ratio Yield
(per cent) (per cent)
1963 1958 1953 1963 1958 1953
NASA Contractors:
Boeing ......................... 37.0 23.9 38.3
United ......................... 50.8 44.8 43.6
North American ................. 50.0 47.9 46.9
General Dynamics ............... 40.6 53.7 45.9
Lockheed ....................... 42.7 38.8 37.7
Douglas ........................ 61.3 55.3 57.0
McDonnell ...................... 18.9 14.0 15.6
Northrup ....................... 23.4 46.6 50.4
Republic ....................... 39.4 57.5 25.0
Grumman ........................ 56.7 132.4 64.6
Standard Companies:
General Motors ................. 64.5 61.8 60.5
Ford Motor Company ............. 41.9 60.1 a
duPont ......................... 77.0 74.9 73.1
Union Carbide .................. 70.9 68.9 61.0
Chrysler ....................... 43.6 b 54.6
Firestone ...................... 39.2 34.5 30.3
Goodrich ........................ 51.8 38.3 29.2
Ohlin-Matheson ................. 52.5 63.8 50.1
U.S. Rubber .................... 40.9 36.3 30.2
Borg-Warner .................... 54.9 52.0 46.0
Libby-Owen-Ford ................ 62.4 64.8 67.7
Corning ....................... 52.8 48.9 42.9
Anchor-Hocking ................ 51.1 45.4 44.7
3.58 5.23 6.99
4.44 5.23 6.79
5.02 6.09 7.65
2.66 4.46 7.04
3.41 5.84 6.21
3.28 6.97 8.73
2.17 3.40 5.15
4.83 6.41 3.67
6.34 6.73 4.40
5.06 7.60 7.70
5.10 7.56 3.78
4.87 4.55 a
3.31 4.08 2.39
3.48 3.53 1.94
3.45 b 3.31
2.88 4.62 3.12
3.17 4.25 3.00
3.12 4.16 2.39
4.37 6.76 3.61
5. Ii 7.12 3.46
4.39 5.88 5.99
1.58 2.53 2.78
4.25 6.00 5.46
i. For more details about companies see footnote 2, table 2
a. Ford Motors did not become open company until 1954.
b. Loss in 1958.
Source: Standards and Poor's and Moody's.
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Another point to consider which Jacoby and Weston did not delve into
explicity is the conclusion to be drawn from another component of the C value,
i. e., yield -- v. Jacoby and Weston imply that yield in the aircraft industry from
1953 forward would fare poorly in comparison with yield for other enterprises.
Table 4 confirms this "prediction", for it is apparent that the NASA contractors'
yield stood high in 1953 and then fell progressively in the later periods, and, in
contrast, the standard companies tended to reverse this behavior. In fact, the
group average yields behaved this way:
NASA contractors
Standard companies
1953 1958 1963
6.63 5.63 3.98
2.99 5.00 4.01
From this it can be seen *_hat the aerospace companies wors_aed their
position, relatively, but that it remains at a favorable level measured in terms
of yield positions of other enterprises.
Still there is one more point to observe in this content: yield in table 4
is given by the formula Y =_._/___M for a ten year period. Therefore, if earn-
ings tend to be relatively high for an industry for a time and/or other bases for
believing they will remain high are apparent, then the market will bid up M so that
Y may decline. This can be viewed as the market dissipation of an industry's
success. For this reason the yield figures at any one time point are not especi-
ally meaningful for evaluating an industry_s performance nor perhaps for pre-
dicting its future. But one might surmise this same point from the algebra of the
calculated earnings: C = VY1/P which becomes C = V_/'_I A/_D which
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reduces to C = V_A/_M. In the final expression, yield vanishes as such.
D. Summary of Interpretations
The weighted mean of the C/A ratios for an industry reflects best how the
industry is faring in terms of earnings, A, that materialize in a specific year
compared with earnings for that year that can be calculated as consistent with (1)
its past oarnings experience, (2) its payout practice, (3} the market response
to both earnings and payout, and (4) the explicit equity investment, V. By this
measure, the NASA contractors were faring well in 1963.
Debt-equity ratios are shown to be possibly misleading when used to make
inference about underlying causes affecting the company or industry. If a com-
pany is small, such as the aerospace companies are but is doing business on a
large scale, a loss can have considerable impact on its equity position,whereas a
large company such as General Motors could absorb a large loss without its
equity capital being disturbed appreciably. Therefore one cannot infer much from
the debt-equity ratio without examining several other statistics at the same time.
It is Concluded, consistently with Jacoby and Weston, that the high debt-
equity ratio of aerospace is not to be accounted for by greater than average payout
rates.
Lastly, the yieId on market value of equity claims for aerospace companies
is observed to have declined from a higher than average level to about average,
as compared with standard companies selected for, comparison in the study, by
1963.
1_¢. Conclusions and Recommendations
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The equity fmanctng standard for plofits allowance: developed by Jacoby
and Weston for lenegutiation purposes has a strong mtuiuve appeal. Based on
that standard, they worked out a formula for calculating a synthetic rate, of re-
turn on equip- capital which the_ infer is an appropriate rate from the social view-
point.
This study makes use of the same concept, an equity finance based standard,
but it adapts their formula tA:_obtain what is called a C/A ratio. This ratio, of
itself, compares the earnings caicu[ated by the equity financing standard formula
with actual earnings. The adapted f_rm was for tJae purpose _f obtaining a measure
that would yield failly definitive answers and yet retain simplicity In its Interpre-
tation. The C/A ratio commends itself on these requirements, and yet, since it
omits a step in calculation that the Jacoby-Weston standard includes, can address
only the question of how well companies have done; it is purely an ex post measure-
mont. On the other hand, the Jacoby-West_n standard is expressed as a rate of
return on equity capit_ and therefore it is adam, table m dealing with decision
problems. The rate ot return -- c_[.culat_l net actual -- of an industry can be used
in negotiation of an appropriate profit margin.
This measure, since it rests upon the cost of equity capital measurement,
is a measure of the market's appraisal of the industry's earning potential. It
provides.a basis fc,r evaluating the risk of a particular industry, and hence what
return it could expect to receive in additic, n to repayment of its explicit costs.
It is necessary t_., kee p in mind the significance of the question of whether
calculated earnings should be based on book value or market value of equity
capital. That is, should the lormula be as presented In {1):
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or of the form:
C = MY 1/P
The argument in section II follows Jacoby and Weston in support of the
former expression. This position is contended by the writer as more appropriate
since book _alue of assets reflected the explicit costs of inputs that make up the
productive capacity against which equity capital has a claim. In contrast, market
value of the equity capital, M, introduces a speculative element that changes period-
ically and may at times be far at variance from the true potential output of the assets
on which equity capital has claim.
Comparison of the C/A findings with other sections of this report is desir-
able also. The conception is similar to the z(t) of Part II; this similarity can be
seen in the following. The C/A is, approximately,
The z{t) ratio used in Part II is 1
j LBw)
Both are expressions_ of an average earnings-price ratio divided by an earnings-
book value ratio. Since the methods of measuring are different one expects some
difference and some similarities in the final measures. In Part II, z(t) = 80 for
the aerospace firms which accords with the weighted C/A value in Table 1 herein.
Similarly, z(t) for automobiles and chemicals is fairly close to the ten year C/A
for 1965 -- 0.56 and 0.31.
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These coml_arisons are similarly favorable for these three industries in
1953 (or 1954), but there is much divergence in 195B. This suggests that the
C/A ratio is more sensitive than one would imagine an average to be. The
behavior of the rubber companies stand out in contrast. For it the level of z is
much below the level of the C/A ratio, but the direction of change is that same
for both measures -- rising.
One can examine the C/A ratios of table 2 and see why a favorable level of
the cost of capital obtains in 1963 fi)r aerospace --North American's C/A is well
below the critical 1:1 level and two other large companies, General Dynamics
and Lockheed, exhibit C/A ratios that compare favorably with the C/A of the
chemical industry. At once it can be seen that the aerospace industry easily
could experience an unfavorable change in its cost of capital, for two large com-
pQni_ _- Iln_ing _nrt ITni,_ -- exhibit C/A r A_tios much above the critical 1:1 level
in 1963. And, oddIy, the C/A ratio records favorably for only one rubber company
-- Firestone, although in 1953 Goodrich was slightly below the critical 1:1 level.
This last observation is a reminder of conclusions reached in the discus-
sion of the empirical findings, sub-section llI, A Restatement may be appropri-
ate: automobile and rubber companies are noted to have experienced more pro-
nounced variation in lhe C/A ratio during 1953-1958-1963 than did the 3.erospace
companies -- NASA contractA>rs, but on the average the C/A ratios for the auto-
mobile industry is much more tavcrable than it is for the aerospace industry. In
contrast, the C/A ratio for aerospace records a more favolable situation than it
does for the rubber industry. The conclusion is suggested from this that the na-
ture of the demand for the plvduct does not account fox the tendency of the cost of
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capital in aerospace to run high.
Moreover, the C/A findings for 1963 suggest that the cost of capital for
aerospace companies is decreasing, perhaps reflecting the market appraisal of
its risk being consistent with that of typical, moderately successful enterprises
doing exclusively commercial business. This point should be affirmed or negated
by C/A findings for 1964 and 1965.
Finally, to reiterate and summarize conclusions contained in the discussion
of findings in subsection III, B and C, the C/A ratio is a more meaningful statistic
than is the widely used debt-equity ratio since the latter can misdirect the hypothe-
sizing. It requires other statistics to insure against erroneous inference, e.g. con-
cluding that high debt-equity ratio is attributable to a high payout rate. That con-
clusion does not apply to aerospace companies although one might have been
prompted to think so in 1953 since the aerospace industry was experiencing a high
yield on equity capital investment.
Appendix A
Observations in the main text with respect to interpretations to be placed
on values of the C/A ratio necessarily are set forth assertatively. Detailed exam-
ination of it as a mechanism would detract from the central discussion. Those
assertions are supported here.
A. Identification of Algebraic Relationships
To begin the argument, consider the _ C/A ratio itself: it is by definitibn the
relationship between two concepts of corporate earnings. The C value is total
calculated earnings for a period, i.e., an artificial value given by formula. The
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A value stands for actual after tax earnings. In performing the calculation for
defining the C value, several variables are required.
V - recorded book value of equity claims on assets of the corporation.
M - value of equity claims expressed in common stock prices,
Y - yield of earnings measured against market value of equity claims,
D - dividend value, i.e., amount actual paid stockholders from earnings,
P - payout ratio of dividends from actual earnings,
A - actual earnings {more completely defined above),
C - calculated earnings defined above.
From these variables it is useful to develop several algebraic expressions
of definitional or behavior relationships among them. Appearing first is the pri-
mary definitional relationship of these variables to calculated earnings, and
fo!!owLng that are e.xtensions of terms contained in the first equation. The defini-
tional equation states that the calculated earnings should be lazge enough to support
equity claims' valuation at a level consistent with continuance of the average payout
ratio and continuance of the average yield percentage:
°t: vt (1)
The average yield Y can be taken for a decade or for some other period of
time. The decade is selected herein following the example of Jacoby and Weston.
Therefore, Y and concomitantly P are averages of the yield percentage and the
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payout rate respectively for the ten-year period terminating with year t: 1
t
10
t-9 (2)
Pt=_ P --10
t-9 (3)
The components of (2) and (3), taken from the definitions of the variables
above, are:
Y = D/M
P = D/A
Therefore (2) and (3) can be reformulated as:
t t
Yt=_ D/d_ " M
t-9 t-9
(4)
(5)
(6)
t t
(7)
The denominator ten appearing in both (2) and (3) is excluded from (6) and
(7), even though in theory it belongs in them, since it cancels out. But it can be
Since two of the basic variables, i.e., V and M, are claims on stocks and two
others, C and A, are flow items, there is a notation problem with respect to
the period t. For the flow items the t must stand for values accumulating dur-
ing the period t, but the stock items could be identified with the beginning, the
middle, the end; or some other point of time within the year t. For present
purposes, it is desirable to designate V t to be the value at the begirming of the
period. It follows that M t should be the value at the end of the period since it
is the market appraisal of V t. Such appraisal depends on the actual earnings
realized during the period, A, and the dividends, D, generated from V, and
consequently it is logically a lagged variable. The exact period of lag may in
practice differ from the nearly full year established here, but the algebra is
more conveniently handled by this assumption and the principle is unchanged
on that account.
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seenthat (1) contains terms composedof (6) and (7) so that it canbe reformulated:
t t
ct =vt : M
t-9 t-9
Once more an element, D in this case, is excluded since it would cancel
out in the algebraic manipulation.
emerges:
An from (8) a useful version of the C/A ratio
t t
Ct/A t=Vt/A t __ A/_.. M
t-9 t-9
(9)
In (9) it is apparent that not only is the C/A ratio sensitive to what value
materializes for A in year t but that on the right hand of the equation, A t affects
both the denominator and the numerator. The effects are not necessaxfly neu-
tralizing, however, and so it is instructive to construct models containing pre-
determined conditions in order to analyze the impact of alterations in the value
of A.
B. Nmnerical Content of the Model
A desirable first condition of the model is that the growth rate for V be
set at eight per cent since that tends to be the average late at which both the
typical NASA contractor and the typical standard company grew for the period
1954-1963. For convenience in developing the model it is desirable also to stip-
ulate that period-by-period V = M and that the eight per cent growth rate be
continual rather than a decade average. (It must be borne m mind that V t is a
beginning year value and that Mt in a year ending vMue. ) Lastly, it is cumber-
some to use a model in which 1_ varies year-to-year, and so it is set at fifty per
cent.
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Having set forth these initial conditions of the model, certain others
follow: (a) M must grow at eight per cent since M (=V) does by assumption, (b)
A - D = D as a consequence of the fifty per cent assumption for P, (c) A - D
grows at eight per cent since At-l-Dt-1 = V t, i.e., A - D of a period is the con-
tribution to growth in V of the next period, and V is growing by eight per cent by
2
initial assumption, (d) combining (b) and (c) leads to conclusion that A and D are
growing at eight per cent and similarly their summations, _A and_D grow at
this rate, and (e) since both A and _A grow at eight per cent and M t and_M t
do also, the ratio At/M t
t t
d_, A/4_=,, M.
t-9 t-9
is equivalent of the ratio contained in (9) --
The last relationship expressed in (e) permits the development of one more
equation that is unique to the conditions assumed:
Ct/A t = Vt/M t (10)
In this unique case the C/A ratio is unity because V = M by initial assump-
This forms the basis for inquiring into the question of the significance oftion.
a non-unitary C/A ratio such as appear in the empirical work.
To accomplish this objective, it is helpful to _quantify formula (9).
be done conveniently by merelY assuming a value, e.g., 1,000,000 for Vt.
the other terms are determined:
Ct/A t = 1,000,000/A t
t t
A/LMt-9
It can
Then
This relationship may appear puzzling. It can be illustrated: if V at beginning
period is 10,000 and V at end of period is 10,800 then the 800 difference is an
eight per cent increase over Vt-1 , but 800 is also _V which identifies with the
terminal value, V t.
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Since M = V, the M t term is 1,000,000, and it follows that the first corn-
3
portent of the summation series, i.e., Mt_9, is 500, 249. Interim terms of the
summation series ax.e sequentially eight per cent greater, one to the next.
sum to 7,246,894, giving now:
Ct/A t = 1,000,000/A t •
t-9
These
A/7, 246, 894
Next, A t and C t (=At) can be determined.
sion (A t - Dr) owing to P being set at 0.5. And A t - D t equals eight per cent of Vt,
i. e., equals _V so A t equals sixteen per cent of V t, and this provides the remain-
ing numerical content of the expression save for the summation of A:
t
160,000/160,000 = I, 000, 000/160, 000 " ____ A/7,246, 894
t-1
But of course it can be solved for at this point and is found to be 1,159,503.
Alternatively it could be obtained in the same way as was the summation of M. (See
footnote 3)
C. Resl_-_nses to Decline in Actual Earnings
Now it can be supposed that the condition A t = 160,000 does not materialize,
but instead it falls to 80,000. This outcome disequilibrates the numerical content
of (9), but there are several possibilities for restoring the balance: (1) Manage-
ment may elect to make the same D payment that would have been forthcoming
had A attained its anticipated value, 160,000; i.e., change P from 0.5 to 1.0 for
this year. Perhaps they imagine that such action would circumvent a market
They are equal to twice the expres-
3 The first in the series of ten summation terms, growing at eight per cent,
results from dividing 1,000,000 by 1, 9990046. This denominator derives
from expansion of the expression for growth, (1 + r) n, to the n = 9th term
with r = 0.08.
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(8) unchanged.
(2) Management alterntively may feel compelled on technical grounds to
maintain the eight per cent growth of V thereby reducing the P ratio for this year
from 0.5 to zero. Both these decisions by management could result in a range of
adjustment possibilities on the part of the market appraisal of V. The extreme
possibilities call for attention.
Suppose that following action (1) management is proved correct in its
judgment, and that it was able to obviate a market response to decline in A. This
means that the market continues its evaluation of M = V owing to the continuance
of the eight per cent growth in D, and equation (8) content becomes:
C = 1, 000, 000 • (1, 159,503 - 80,000)/7,246,894 = 1,079,503,000,
t
000/7,246, 994
and the C/A ratio stands at 1. 862:1.
Alternatively_ and indeed more likely, management may be wrong in its
judgment of the market reaction to a fall in earnings accompanied by the continu-
ance of anticipated dividend payments, for equity claimants and potential equity
claimants are influenced by the value of the assets in the enterprise which they
can claim as well as by the amounts of dividends they receive. Therefore, it is
possible that market reaction to management's execution of action (1) would result
in the deflation of Mt and consequently affect a reduction in the summation of M.
It is not likely that M t would fall to fifty per cent of V t based on this one time
deviation of At from its decade trend, but perhaps a decline of ten per cent would
not be far off. Hence,
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C t =1,000,000. 1,079,503/(7,246,894- 1,000,000)
= 151,045
and the C/A ratio stands still higher than in the former case, being 1. 888: 1o
Implicit in the above examination is the fact that if the C/A ratios were
to hold constant at the 1:1 relationship despite the fall in earnings, A, the term
t
q_,M must rise appreciably. Since all M values in the summation are fixed except
t-9
Mt, it would have to absorb the entire adjustment in this case. Following through on
the first case with this additional assumption: the Ct/A t ratio continues to be unity,
but its numerical calculation changes from Ct/A t = 160,000/160,000 to Ct/A t =
80,000. In (8) then the results are:
t t
Ct = Vt " _A/XM
t-9 t-9
t
1_ 000, 000 " (1, 159,503 - 809 000)/_ M80, 000
t-9
t
t__ M = (1,000,000 " 1,079,503)/80,090 = 13_ 493_ 788
(Some other details of the adjustment procedure may be helpful. The
summation A term is reduced by 80,000 because At, its last component is reduced
from 160, 000 to 80,000 by assumption. This requires the summation M term to
change from 7,246, 894 to 13, 493, 788 in order to maintain the equilibrium with
Ct/A t = 1. It would need to double exactly to maintain equilibrium except that
the summation A term falls by 80,000. The composition of the summation M
t. 1
term changes in this way: when A t = 160,000, ___M t is composed of the series
t-9 t-1
Mt_ 9, Mt-8, . . . M t with M t = 1,000, 000. Therefore_ lVlt is equal to
t-9
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7,246,894 - 1,000,000, i.e., 6, 246,894. But when A t -- 80,000, the first
nine elements of the summation M term remain unchanged, and therefore M t
becomes 13,493, 788 - 6,246,894, i.e., M t = 7,246, 894.)
The conclusion emerges: if the C/A ratio is to remain unity with a
halving of At, Mt must increase manyfold. How much Mt must increase is a function
of both the growth rate and the length of time chosen for the summation period -- it
can be different than the ten-year period selected herein. A second conclusion is
patent: if the C/A ratio were to fall with a fall in At, then M t value would have to
rise by an even greater amount. Since it is most unlikely that Mt would rise in
association with a fall in At, it can be concluded that the C/A ratio changes in-
versely to a pronounced change in At.
There is a final possibility not considered above. V t remains unchanged
no matter the other alterations in assumptions and other terms. It was handled
this way for the simple reason that the model has no provision for changing V
since it is the book value which by accounting convention is not changed. There-
fore it is unaffected by changes in A t .
as the price of capital assets changes,
Nevertheless, the real value of V t can change
i. e., inflation could raise the real value
of V t while its stipulated value is unchanged. Since actual and potential equity
owners consider this point in making their investment decisions, in the main text
the C/A ratios were calculated after V was adjusted to reflect rising prices. It
is necessary to consider how that fact modifies the above argument.
D. Result: Equity Capital Erosion
In the first two cases, the C/A ratio rose to 1. 862:1 and 1. 888:1. In both
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situations, if V t were raised above the 1, 000,000 by a price index, the C/A
ratio values would be even greater than those found. In the third case, the
C/A ratio was held constant by assumption and the M t term had to absorb the
entire adjustment reaction. If Vt were greater, then the adjustment requirement
imposed on M would be greater, and since it was concluded that such adjustment
t
is virtually nil in the real world, it would appear even less likely with V t greater.
Since the latter case is unrealistic, the former two cases must be represen-
tative of the directional reactions of the market, measures in C/A values, to
pronounced reductions in earnings from their growth trends. In sum, they imply
that high and/or rising C/A ratios reflect the market's downward reappraisal
of equity claims based on relative decline in earnings. Therefore, in two senses
there is apparenterosion of the capital base associated with high C/A ratios.
One, market appraisal reflects a composite judgment of the present value of the
stream of earnings expected to be associated with equity claims on assets. It
is an unmaterialized valuation of equity claims, and as such it is an estimate of
what ultimately will materialize if earnings do not improve in the meantime.
Secondly, to the extent that this enterprise is experient_ng earning rates less than
those of other enterprises in which equity claimants could have elected to make
their equity investment, opportunity losses are absorbed by these owners and
accordingly their equity capital is eroded.
E. No Growth Condition
Discussion above deals with a model involving growth in equity claims. It
is a model in which it is assumed that all increases in equity are internally generated,
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and hence this is genuine growth, the source of which is entirely from earnings.
Therefore, for grc_wth in equity to come about, there must be either growth in
earnings or alternatively a continual decline in payout. The latter condition, of
course, could not persist indefinitely, and this prompts the possibility of a no-
growth-in-equity situation.
The no-equity-growth circumstance could exist indefinitely with rising or fall-
ing earnings so long as they did not fall below zero. A model for this warrants
consideration. Implicit to the model is the condition that the payout ratio (P) is
always unity. Anither condition that makes the model more manageable for ana-
lytical purposes is that initially the earnings (A) be assumed constant. It follows
that the model has several other constants: V_ A (=A), D (=D), and P (=P). The
term_M remains free to vary since Mt can vary, and consequently C may vary, and
of course on the basis of conclusions reached in section C it will move inversely
with variations in M t-
If the model is constructed on the assumption that in periods prior to t the
the_" M = 10V, and a further equation of some use mayrelationship M = V held,
be presented:
C/A =V/A- _A/IOV (ii)
Since the term_A is equal to 10A because A is constant, then (ii) can be
expressed in variant form and solved:
C/A = V/A " A-/V, but since A = A, this becomes C/A = V/A • A/V=I
A/V
=1
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In the event that the price of capital is rising, however, V does not hold
constant in real terms and the C/A ratio rises accordingly. Alternatively, if A
remains constant and V in real terms does also, then M may rise or fall, depend-
m
ing entirely on what other enterprises are experiencing in their earnings, growth,
etc. It follows that if A rises with V constant in real terms, D must rise; so surely
would M. In the latter case, M may or may not rise enough to maintain proportion-
in the ratio A/_M, and so the directional responses of the C/A ratio cannot beality
predicted without supplementary statistics.
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Appendix B
Depreciable assets compose a large portion of total assets on which owners'
of an enterprise exert their equity claims. These assets accumulate into property
accounts over several years, and the prices at which each asset enters the account
is recorded at its initial cost (or value). This valuation of an asset remains intact on
the books of account unadjusted, with rare exceptions, until the asset_'s life expires.
Through the years that the asset is available for use its replacement cost changes --
typically upward during the past two decades -- and so its book value, also called
historical value, differs from its current value at replacement cost.
The equity capital concept (V) was adjusted in this study to take account of
this growing divergence between book value and replacement value. This was ac-
16
complished, as cited in textual discussion, by use of ratios relating replacement
cost to historical cost. The companies' depreciable assets were simply inflated
by that ratio, one which applied in 1953, another for 1958, and a third for 1963.
One problem persists, however, for properly the replacement cost of assets
does not change uniformly.among the industries. The study from which the ratios
were calculated does not have the industrial detail that is desirable. For example,
aerospace and automobile companies were adjusted by the same ratio since they
both classify in the two-digit manufacturing industrial group -- transportation
equipment, SIC 37. Undoubtedly the life cycle of aerospace assets differs from that
of automobile manufacturers and similarly their capital replacement costs changed
at different rates through the years. Therefore there is some element of bias in
this procedure.
16 Supra, fm 3.
I
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The same point could be made for each of the other manufacturing groups:
it would be desirable to have a finer industrial breakdown for this adjustment of
assets' values. On the other hand, it also true that the companies do not in all
cases conform well to the industrial group in which they classify even at the two-
digit level of the SIC code -- they are too much of conglomerates. So this is another
problem that could not be dealt with -- merely recognized.
A final problem involves the index of capital assets' prices that was used in
the study upon which this one drew. It is the common index problem about which
the literature speaks often, but which involves such huge undertakings to improve
on that not even the U.S. Government has made more than a token effort to deal
with it. Simply put, there is not enough information and data on the prices of
different capital assets, and therefore any price adjustment remains rather gross.
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A Review of Economic Profit Theories
There is no general agreement among economists regarding the definition of
profit beyond that it is, in fact, a conceptually difficult problem. We cannot say
for profit, as has been said for wages, the return to labor; interest, the return to
capital; and rent, the return to ]and, that it is clearly a functions] return for
some specific action performed within the economy.
The most simple definition ef profit is that it is the residual left after paying
all costs; if all costs cannot be met there exists a negative prof, t. The above is in
the context of pure profits; that is, it must be residual and not part of the other
functional returns (wages, interests and rent). Profits are temporary phenomena,
arising because there are imperfections in the economic system. "For a thousand
reasons the economic organism does not function quite properly. Error, mishap,
indolence, and so forth become, in the well known manner, a continual source of
loss, but also of profit. _1 If the system were perfectly competitive (both in the
factor market and in the producer's market), there would be no profit. In a purely
competitive system what is considered as a "fair return" to the producer is in-
cluded in the cost curve (fair in the sense of inducing the firm to remain in a given
industry). In terms of general practicality, it is necessary to account for the
rationale for making payments of profit to the firm.
Various theories have been advanced in an effort to explain from whence
this residual arises; they are as apayment ofwindfall or gratuity, as a result of gaining
1 Schumpeter, Joseph A., The Theory of Economic Development, Harvard
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University Press_ Cambridge, Mass., 1955, p.32.
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a monopolistic position in the market, for the undertaking of ventures involving
risk, and for enterpreneurial innovations. These theories fall into two
branches of though; those theories which are nonfunctional, i.e., monopolistic
position or windfall gratuities, and those which are functional, i.e., risk bearing
and innovational theories.
The theory of profit return stemming from a monopolistic position in the
market is very basic. The firm need only be the first in the market or hold some
exclusive right to a particular product, e.g., a patent or trademark. It arises
as a result of singleness of position. (This is true analytically due to the nature
of the demand curve faced by the firm under these conditions, downward sloping
to the right as opposed to perfectly horizontal under conditions of pure competition. )
This type of profit can be competed away by other firms. The ease or difficulty
of so doing depends upon the strength of the consumer's preference for __hhep_ro__,ct
and the ease of producing a substitute good.
The windfall profit "... may be defined loosely as unanticipated changes in
the value of property relative to other real goods. ,,2 Thus it is part of the dynamic
nature of the economy. 3 "Any favorable change in economic conditions not gen-
erally foreseen and allowed for in advance brings a temporary profit, ''_ and such
profits are commonly a result of forces beyond the control of the producer. In
2 Dean, Joel, Managerial Economics, Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., 1964, p. 18.
3 Not in the sense of dynamic referring to mere changes, but becuuse the nature
of the changes are unpredictable. Profits can arise in a static or stationary
state if imperfections are allowed for within it.
4 Abbott, Lawrence, Economics and the Modern World, Harcourt Brace, & Co.,
New York, 1960, p. 674.
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economic terminology, these forces are called exogenous variables; that is,
they are held as constants, outside the economic system under analysis, e.g., war,
population changes, changes in technology, and changes in the general price level.
When these forces act in a benevolent manner to the producer, he will experience
a windfall profit (in the opposite case he will, of course, experience a windfall
loss).
The fundamental idea behind the risk theory is that in order to induce a
producer to undertake the risks involved with production, i.e., risks of owner-
ship and the holding of non-liquid assets, he must receive some sort of reward,
profit. There is risk in every action the producer makes in the sense that dealing
with the future entailsuncertainty. This is a dynamic aspect of the economy. It
is a major consideration since once the initialrisks have been run, his return
could be reduced to correspond to the risks remaining to be run. Risk can also
work in favor of the producer since ittends to act as a barrier to others wishing
to enter the field.
Restrictions can be made upon the amount of risk the producer undertakes.
Risk in the ordinary meaning of the word is "measurable where anticipation may
be guided by statistical probability. Uncertainty is restricted to cases of the non-
quantitative type. '" 5 Calculable risks can be covered by insurance, those which
are incalculable cannot. Incalculable risks are compounded by their uncertain
nature.
Weston, J. Fred, "A Generalized Uncertainty Theory of Profit," American
Economic Review, March 1950.
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Frank H. Knight, the chief pr_tagnoist of the risk theory of profit, cate-
gorizes risk into the aforementioned types, believing that the profit return is a
result of the uncertainty, type of risk.
The normal economic situation is of this character: The
adventurer has an opinion as to the outcome, within more
or less narrow limits. If he is inclined to make the ven-
ture, this opinion is either an expectation of a certain
definite gain or a belief in the real probability of a larger
one. Outside the limits of the anticipation any other
result becomes more and more improbable in his mind
as the amount thought of diverges either way. Hence it is
correct to treat all instances of economic uncertainty as
cases of choice between a smaller reward more confidently
and a larger one less confidently anticipated_ 6
Schumpeter, in his development of a theory of profits as a result of entre-
preneurial innovations, discusses the problem of risk at some length. Basically,
he agrees with the uncertainty theory of risk, but he does not attribute the main
source of profit to it.
Two kinds of risk may be distinguished, the risk of tech-
nical failure of production, in which we can include the
danger of loss from acts of God, and the risk of commercial
failure ... Businessmen will take account of - and equalize-
the difference in risk between the branches of production by
simply avoiding the more risky branches until the conse-
quent increase of prices in the latter offers a compensation.
None of these methods of evening out economic risks, in
principle, creates a profit... The matter is different of
course, if the risks are not foreseen or at any rate are not
taken account of in the economic plan. They then become on
the one hand sources of temporary loss and on the other hand
sources of temporary gains. 7
6 Knight, Frank H., Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Houghton Mifflin Company,
New York, 1921, p. 237.
7 Op. Cit., Schumpeter, pp. 22-3.
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A profit which is a return due to entrepreneurial innovations is a result
of the entrepreneurs carrying out new combinations with existing resources.
"The carrying out of new combinations means ... simply the different employ-
ment of the economic system's existing supplies of production." 8 Entrepreneurial
profit, then is... "the surplus, to which no liabilities correspond .... ,,,9
The entrepreneur is the motivating force behind the introduction of the innova-
tion. Entrepreneur, a word of french origin, was first used to describe the business-
man who undertook the entire burden of his business; financing, organizing, and
bearing all of the risk involved. The modern business entity, the corporation, is
characterized by a separation of ownership and management. This has caused some
confusion regarding identification of the entrepreneur since there is not an easily
identifiable person who fulfills the original definition (with the possible exception
of Howard Hughes}. This problem is confronted by Schumpeter who rationalized
that:
• .. it is not essential to the matter though it may happen -
that the new combination should be carried out by the same
people who control the productive or commercial progress
_10
which is to be displaced by the new ....
A succinct summarization of this can be made by saying that he means command
over the means of production as being necessary to the carrying out of new com'_
binations but not actual ownership or the bearing of risk. He states further that:
8 Ibid, p. 66
9 Ibid, p. 132
10 [bid, p. 66
113
Risk obviously always falls on the owner of the means
of production or of money capital which was paid for
them, hence, never on the entrepreneur as such. il
.... even if the entrepreneur finances himself out of
former profits or if he contributes the means of produc-
tion belonging to his "static" business, the risk falls on
him as capitalist or as professor of goods, not as entre-
preneur ... Even though he may risk his reputation, the
direct economic responsibility of failure never falls on
him. ]2
The entrepreneur, then, is someone who carries out innovation. This person could
be a shareholder, member cf the board of directors or part of the management.
Whether he is any or all of these people, he is only considered as an entrepreneur
when he carries out new combinations. An approximation of fulfilling the original
meaning of the word entrepreneur would occur if management or a member of the
board of directors is also a shareholder and performs as an entrepreneur, because
he would fi]] the re_irem_e_ts of fkna_cing, be_rLng rLqk, and organi_ing_ (The
question of management or member of the board of directors is quite interesting.
In this capacity one would be in the position to take advantage ef the lucrative
opportunities of stock options offered by the company. They could, therefore,
amass a sizeable amount of stock in the firm ever a period of time. Their inter-
est in the firm as owner-risk bearer weuld therefore be heightened. ) In its
usual capacity management is considered as being a high-level supervisory task.
It is, as previously mentioned, only when one of these men carries out innovation
that he is considered to be an entrepreneur, and once the innovation has been
11 Ibid, p. 75.
12 _id, p. 137
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introduced it becomes datum and he again assumes the role of management.
Clearly, the entrepreneur must be identified by his active role in the firm rather
than his position with it.
The carrying out of new combinations we call "enter-
prise;" the individuals whose function it is to carry
them out we call "entrepreneurs" ... in the first
place we call entrepreneurs not only those "indepen-
dent" businessmen in an exchange economy who are
usually so designated, but all who actually fulfill the
function by which we define the concept, even if they
are, as is becoming the rule, "dependent" employees
of a corporation, like managers, members of boards
of directors and so forth, or even if their actual power
to perform the entrepreneruial function has any other
foundations, such as control of a majority of shares
... it does not include all heads of firms or managers
or industrialists who merely may operate an establish-
ed business, but only those who actually perform that
function.
Therefore we have distinguished between entrepreneurs
and capitalists irrespective of whether the latter are
regarded as owners of money, claims to money, or
material goods ... It also settles the question whether
the ordinary shareholder as such is an entrepreneur and
disposes of the entrepreneur as the risk bearer. 13
The entrepreneur as a leader emerges when opportunities come before
him. He does not have to actively seek them out. Possibilities are all around him,
being gathered by all sorts or people - it is his function to combine them and put
them through. (Thus to invent is not necessarily to be a leader, for to qualify as
a leader the invention must be carried through). He must have the insight into
the problem at hand and catch the imagination of others, he must compete existing
resources from their present use and free them for his own use in the new
1_ Ibid, p. 74
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combination.
•.. the carrying out of new combinations is a special function,
and the privilege of a type of people who are much less
numerous than all those who have the "objective" possibility
of doing it. Therefore ... entrepreneurs are a special
type, and their behavior a special problem• 12
It is conceptually an almost insurmountable task to attempt the derivation of a
functional theory of profit. Certain factors do exist in the aerospace industry which
might, possibly, allow one to develop such a theory.
It cannot be denied that the financial risks of the business
are, at least on any single venture, lower in the defense
business. In situations w_ere uncertainty is higher, cost-
type contracts are used. J.q)
However, this would involve a lengthy study with a high probability of a negative
outcome. * As desirable as it seems to derive such a functional relationship,
profit theo_r is at present in too rough a state-of-art to accomplish this task. One
must be satisfied to realize that a fee above cost, (profit) must be paid to firm to
induce them to remain in a given line of endeavor and to keep them competitively
viable.
12 Ibid, P. 83.
15 Arthur D. Little, How Sick Is the Defense Industry ? Cambridge_ Mass.,
1963, P. 70.
* There exists a very high degree of continual innovation in the aerospace in-
dustry, which could form the foundation of an entrepreneurial innovation
theory. The success of such a theory depends upon whether or not the risk
element can be handled by virtue of its inclusion in the contract form. A
cursory examination of such a theory reveals that this is only party possible
- if risk is held as a parameter and the theory built upon innovation, there may
still remain an element of profit unaccounted for, a clear indication that the
innovational theory would be an inadequate solution.
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IERRATA
Page 9-10 : Table 2 should appear on page 25 replacing the Table
2 found thereon. The Table 2 now appearing on page
25 is an erroneous duplication of Table 2 of Part II,
and is properly located on page 83.
Page 21: Line 1 should read:
adj NW(t) = .5 [NW(t) - Pat(t) + DiV(t) +NW(t-I)]
Line 5 should read:
The return rates in Table 1 . . .
Line 7 (table number) should read(instead of Table 2)
Table 1
Page 51: Line 17 (topic heading) should read:
Examination of the Measuresp (t), r(t) and z(t)
